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ESTIMATING THE EARNINGS LOSS
ASSOCIATED WITH A CRIMINAL RECORD AND
SUSPENDED DRIVER’S LICENSE
Colleen Chien, Alexandra George, Srihari Shekhar,
and Robert Apel****

As states pass reforms to reduce the size of their prison populations, the number of
Americans physically incarcerated has declined. However, the number of people
whose employment and related opportunities are limited due to their criminal
records continues to grow. Another sanction that curtails economic opportunity is
the loss of one’s driver’s license for reasons unrelated to driving. While many states
have “second chance” laws on the books that provide, e.g. expungement or driver’s
license restoration, a growing body of research has documented large “second
chance gaps” between eligibility and delivery of relief due to the poor
administration of second chance relief. This paper is a first attempt to measure the
cost of these “paper prisons” of limited economic opportunity due to expungable
records and restorable licenses, in terms of annual lost earnings. Analyzing the
literature, we estimate the annual earnings loss associated with misdemeanor and
felony convictions to be $5,100 and $6,400, respectively, and that of a suspended
license to be $12,700.
We use Texas as a case study for comparing the cost (in terms of lost earnings) of
the state’s “paper prisons” – living with sealable records or restorable licenses –
with the cost of its physical prisons. In Texas, individuals with criminal convictions
may seal their records after a waiting period. But analyzing administrative data, we
find that approximately 95% of people eligible for relief have not accessed it. This
leaves 670,000 people in the “second chance sealing gap” eligible for but not
accessing second chance relief, translating into an annual earnings loss of about
$3.5 billion. Similarly, people that have lost driver’s licenses are entitled to get their
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licenses restored under the law (in the form of “occupational driver’s licenses,” or
“ODLs”) in order to drive to work or school. But using a similar approach, we find
that about 80% of the people that appear eligible for restored driver’s licenses in
Texas have not received them. This translates into about 430,000 people who
needlessly lack licenses and a lower-bounds earnings loss of about $5.5 billion.
Based on these figures, we find the cumulative annual earnings loss associated with
Texas’s “paper prisons” of limited economic opportunity due to lost but restorable
licenses and convictions records eligible for sealing to be comparable with, and
likely more than, the yearly cost to Texas of managing its physical prisons of around
$3.6 billion.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2002, Christian Watts was charged with felony drug possession after
connecting a friend with a contact who had a supply of MDMA (ecstasy).1 Watts
pleaded guilty to a lower misdemeanor charge, and the judge sentenced him to 3
months of house arrest and 36 months of probation.2 At an average cost of $9.17 per
day of probation, Watts’s supervision cost federal taxpayers approximately $9,904.3
But the consequences of his conviction did not end there. Since Watts completed his
sentence, he has been denied civilian and military employment opportunities due to
his record.4 Despite earning associate’s and bachelor’s degrees, and the praise of a
judge for his self-rehabilitation efforts,5 Watts has been able to find work only as a
dog walker and CrossFit trainer, jobs with average annual incomes of around
$35,000.6 Commenting that “my life is stuck in a standstill,”7 Watts has abandoned
plans to become a lawyer, a profession with an average annual income of about
$90,000.8 These figures imply a potential earnings gap of $55,000 per year and,
associated with it, a gap in productivity, skills, and tax revenue.
In 2002, Demetrice Moore, a Certified Nursing Assistant (“CNA”), was
convicted of grand larceny and sentenced to jail and costs, including the cost of the
1.
Maya Rhodan, A Misdemeanor Conviction Is Not a Big Deal, Right? Think
Again, TIME, (Apr. 24, 2014, 5:26 PM), https://time.com/76356/a-misdemeanor-convictionis-not-a-big-deal-right-think-again/ [https://perma.cc/VLW7-F3NR].
2.
Id.; United States v. Watts, Order No. 2:04-CR-00146-PMP-RJJ (D. Nev. Apr.
25, 2011).
3.
$9.17 per day x 30 days per month x 36 months = $9,903.60. For per-day
probation supervision costs, see Supervision Costs Significantly Less than Incarceration in
Federal
System,
U.S.
CTS.
(July
18,
2013),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/07/18/supervision-costs-significantly-lessincarceration-federal-system [https://perma.cc/VX3P-PZXV].
4.
Watts, Order No. 2:04-CR-00146-PMP-RJJ.
5.
Id.; Rhodan, supra note 1 (At Watts’s hearing, the judge said, “I wish I had far
more people before me who show the kind of self-rehabilitation and effort that you’ve
demonstrated” and even shook Watts’s hand.).
6.
See Professional Dog Walker Salary in Las Vegas, NV, ZIPRECRUITER,
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/Salaries/Professional-Dog-Walker-Salary-in-Las-Vegas,NV
[https://perma.cc/5DX2-GFE6]; Fitness Trainer Salary in Las Vegas, NV, ZIPRECRUITER,
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/Salaries/Fitness-Trainer-Salary-in-Las-Vegas,NV
[https://perma.cc/ZNQ3-4WAG] (listing average salaries at $30,906 and $36,325,
respectively).
7.
Rhodan, supra note 1.
8.
See Prosecutor Salary in Las Vegas, NV, ZIPRECRUITER,
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/Salaries/Prosecutor-Salary-in-Las-Vegas,NV
[https://perma.cc/LZ7R-UDDL]. See also Watts, supra note 4 (Watts explained, “I want to
continue to further my education and have an active application into Boyd school of law for
this fall semester. I’m hoping to pursue a career as a prosecutor. Law school is costly and at
37 years old loans of that magnitude can be daunting. I did not want this to deter me from
accomplishing my goal. I came to discover if I served my country in the military, not only
can I satisfy my sense of duty, contribute to the greater good, but the government will help
me with the cost of my education. I want very much to enlist as an officer and serve, possibly
in the National Guard. However, no branch of the military will accept me with my current
federal drug conviction.”).
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lawyer appointed to represent her because she was indigent.9 Moore served her time
but could not repay the costs.10 As a result, her driver’s license was automatically
suspended.11 This interfered with her work because “[a]s a CNA, she had to drive
extensively to care for elderly and disabled patients in their homes.”12 Despite this,
Moore attempted to keep working and was consequently convicted several times
and jailed for driving with a suspended license. 13 In the end, Moore had to “stop[]
working as a CNA because of the required driving.”14 An average-to-experienced
CNA makes around $30,000 to $40,000 annually.15
Many have commented on the massive size of the American criminal
justice system and celebrated reforms to reduce it.16 But while the number of people
put behind bars declines,17 those who have old convictions and criminal records18
continue to encounter structural barriers to work or the deprivation of a driver’s
license.19 Among the freedoms curtailed by losing one’s license or having a criminal
9.
Mario Salas & Angela Ciolfi, Driven by Dollars: A State-By-State Analysis of
Driver’s License Suspension Laws for Failure to Pay Court Debt, LEGAL AID JUST. CTR. 3
(Fall 2017), https://www.justice4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Driven-by-Dollars.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TB7Z-DPDF].
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Certified Nursing Assistant Salary Guide, NURSEJOURNAL (Mar. 2, 2022),
https://nursejournal.org/cna/salary/ [https://perma.cc/C24X-AX9L].
16.
See Overcrowding and Overuse of Imprisonment in the United States, AM.
CIV.
LIBERTIES
UNION
8
(May
2015),
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/RuleOfLaw/OverIncarceration/
ACLU.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLQ5-33SE] (discussing the causes of the growth in the U.S.
incarcerated population).
17.
John Gramlich, America’s Incarceration Rate Falls to Lowest Level Since
1995, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2021/08/16/americas-incarceration-rate-lowest-since-1995/
[https://perma.cc/58GZ3VJW] (“At the end of 2019, there were just under 2.1 million people behind bars in the U.S.,
including 1.43 million under the jurisdiction of federal and state prisons and roughly 735,000
in the custody of locally run jails.”).
18.
Becki Goggins, New Blog Series Takes Closer Look at Findings of
SEARCH/BJS Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, 2016, SEARCH (Mar.
29, 2018),
https://www.search.org/new-blog-series-takes-closer-look-at-findings-of-search-bjs-surveyof-state-criminal-history-information-systems-2016/
[https://perma.cc/U2QS-NLW2]
(showing the growth in the number of subjects in state criminal history files from about 81
MILLION in 2006 to about 110 million in 2016, however representing biometric (fingerprint)
data that contains duplicates).
19.
See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1192 (2020) (In her concurring opinion,
Justice Kagan notes that “several studies have found that most license suspensions do not
relate to driving at all; what they most relate to is being poor.”). See also Best Practices to
Reducing Suspended Drivers, AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLES 34–37 (Feb. 2013),
https://web.archive.org/web/20220215144910/https://www.aamva.org/Suspended-andRevoked-Drivers-Working-Group/ (Building off of the Department of Transportation’s H.S.
811 092, “Reasons for Drivers License Suspension, Recidivism and Crash Involvement
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history, economic liberty stands out. As the Supreme Court commented about
suspended licenses in Bell v. Burson, “[o]nce licenses are issued . . . their continued
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the
licensees.”20
To remove these barriers, nearly every state has laws on the books that
allow old, generally minor, convictions to be expunged.21 In many states, lost
licenses can be restored in order to support going to work or school. 22 But as an
emerging literature has documented, the poor administration of “second chance”
policies means that many of the people, and often the majority, that are eligible for
“second chance” laws to, e.g., expunge records or restore licenses, are not receiving
the benefits of these laws. One of us has defined this difference as the “second
chance gap” and estimated its size across a number of realms, including
expungement, restoration of the right to vote, and resentencing.23 An associated
project, the Paper Prisons Initiative, has documented uptake rates of expungement
across over a dozen states, finding rates of less than 10%—implying that over 90%
of eligible people are not taking advantage of the law—to be common.24

among Suspended/Revoked Drivers,” this study estimates that, based on a sample of drivers
from six states in the United States, the number of people who had licenses suspended for
reasons unrelated to driving increased from 21% to 29% between 2002 and 2006.). But see,
e.g., Nina R. Joyce et al., Individual and Geographic Variation in Driver’s License
Suspensions: Evidence of Disparities by Race, Ethnicity, and Income, 19 J. TRANSP. &
HEALTH 1, 3–5 (2020) (finding that, based on a random sample of about 7.6 million drivers
in New Jersey, the prevalence of people with non-driving-related suspensions between 2004
and 2018 decreased from 7.9% to 5%).
20.
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
21.
In this Article, we use the word “expunged” to refer generally to the shielding
of records from public view through records remediations strategies such as sealing, orders
of nondisclosure, and expunction.
22.
See What Is a Hardship License vs. Restricted License Comparison,
INTOXALOCK (June 30, 2021), https://www.intoxalock.com/blog/post/difference-betweenhardship-and-restricted-license/ [https://perma.cc/HF27-A34H] (describing that states
including Florida, Indiana, Wisconsin, Arkansas, and Kentucky all have “hardship licenses”
that allow certain individuals to have licenses for going to work, and California, Texas,
Washington, Virginia, and Iowa have “restricted licenses” that serve a similar purpose). Such
licenses are also available to drivers in Pennsylvania. See also Occupational Limited License,
PA. DEP’T TRANSP. & VEHICLE SERVS., https://www.dmv.pa.gov/InformationCenters/Suspensions/Pages/Occupational-Limited-Licenses.aspx [https://perma.cc/54YRUEVZ].
23.
See Colleen Chien, America’s Paper Prisons: The Second Chance Gaps, 119
Mɪᴄʜ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 519, 519 (2020) (analyzing a variety of second chance programs in the United
States, including clemency, compassionate release, resentencing, and nonconvictions
expungement, and finding that in many cases “only a small fraction (less than 10 percent) of
those eligible for relief actually received it.”).
24.
PAPER
PRISONS
INITIATIVE,
https://www.paperprisons.org/
[https://perma.cc/XX2F-4V7H] (documenting the “uptake rate” of expungement relief in
states across the United States); see also J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of
Criminal Convictions: An Empirical Study, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2460, 2461 (2020) (finding
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The economic impacts of paper prisons are more difficult to quantify than
the out-of-pocket costs of physical prisons, but they are still consequential. Though
the total unemployment rate in January 2022 was less than 4%, the last estimate of
unemployment of formerly incarcerated people living in the United States,
published in 2018, reported an unemployment rate of “over 27%—higher than the
total U.S. unemployment rate during any historical period, including the Great
Depression, at which time the figure was close to triple the national unemployment
rate.”25
But the fact that the costs of paper prisons are largely unquantified and
unknown makes it difficult to know how much to prioritize closing such paper
prisons through full delivery of second chances. It also obscures the cost of the poor
drafting of second chance laws, which in many cases are complicated and difficult
to apply.26 One obstacle to passing “clean slate” bills that would narrow the second
chance gap has been the out-of-pocket costs of updating records.27 But an
understanding of the costs of paper prisons and a lack of action to close them is
lacking. As such, it is important to quantify the economic costs of second chance
gaps. This Article does so by estimating the earnings and employment consequences
of old expungable convictions and lost driver’s licenses that are available for
restoration under existing law.
Part I of the Article provides an overview of two of Texas’s second chance
laws, governing the grant of orders of nondisclosure (“ONDs”) and restoration of
occupational driver’s licenses (“ODLs”). It details the processes required to obtain
each form of second chance relief and explores how various administrative factors
may contribute to gaps in their uptake. Part II then describes the populations of
people eligible for convictions and driver’s license relief and our methodology for
estimating each second chance gap, measured by the number of individuals with
records who qualify for relief (the “current gap”), the share of people eligible for a
given second chance that have obtained it (the “uptake gap”), and the number of
years it would take to clear each second chance backlog based on the current pace
of relief. Part III presents estimates of the lost earnings and employment
consequences associated with a criminal record and a lost driver’s license. We then

that in Michigan, “among those legally eligible for expungement, just 6.5% obtain it within
five years of eligibility”).
25.
Lucius Couloute & Daniel Kopf, Out of Prison & Out of Work: Unemployment
Among Formerly Incarcerated People, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 2018),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/outofwork.html
[https://perma.cc/E85F-LAAD]
(describing the findings based on the National Former Prisoner Survey, conducted in 2008);
Kimberly Amadeo, Unemployment Rate by Year Since 1929 Compared to Inflation and GDP,
THE
BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/unemployment-rate-by-year-3305506
[https://perma.cc/E85F-LAAD] (reporting a national unemployment rate of 10% in 2009).
26.
See infra Appendix Part A for a description of Texas’s sealing law.
27.
See, e.g., Rachel M. Cohen, Washington Governor Vetoes Bill that Would
Have Automatically Cleared Criminal Records, THE APPEAL (May 19, 2020),
https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/washington-governor-vetoes-clean-slate-bill/
[https://perma.cc/L6ZK-V8M6] (Washington State in 2020 passed a “clean slate” bill that
would have narrowed the second chance gap, but the Governor vetoed the bill due to cost, in
part due to the anticipated cost of COVID expenditures).
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use these estimates and the findings from Part II to calculate the earnings loss
associated with Texas’s paper prisons.
In Texas, we find that approximately 5% of people eligible for sealing relief
have accessed it, leaving a gap of about 670,000 people (with people in the gap
having their last conviction, on average, 17 years ago). We estimate the earnings
loss associated with this gap to be approximately $3.5 billion annually. Using a
similar approach, we find that about 20% of people eligible for ODLs in Texas have
accessed them—leaving a gap of 430,000 people eligible for ODLs who have not
gotten one—which translates into an earnings loss of about $5.5 billion. Based on
these figures, we find the cumulative annual earnings loss associated with Texas’s
“paper prisons” to compare to, and even exceed, the yearly cost of funding physical
prisons in Texas, which is around $3.6 billion.

I. OVERVIEW OF TEXAS’S RECORD SEALING AND LICENSE
REINSTATEMENT LAWS
For our exploration of the economic impacts of the second chance gap, we
used Texas as a case study for a few reasons. First, Texas has the ninth largest
economy in the world by GDP and prides itself on being business friendly and a
reliable source of skilled workers.28 Secondly, like many states, Texas has been
under fiscal pressure to reform and reduce the costs of its criminal justice system
and has led the country in many respects in doing so.29 As part of this reform,
policymakers and politicians have widely celebrated the cost savings associated with
closing Texas’s physical prisons.30 However, while the number of Texans who were
incarcerated in state prisons and jails decreased by 20% between fiscal years 2005
and 2020,31 the number of individuals with a criminal history in the state doubled
28.
Texas Enters 2021 as World’s 9th Largest Economy by GDP, TEX. DEV. CORP.
(Jan. 27, 2021), https://businessintexas.com/news/texas-enters-2021-as-worlds-9th-largesteconomy-by-gdp/ [https://perma.cc/ML4J-FR7J] (describing the benefits of Texas for
businesses as including “highly competitive tax climate, world-class infrastructure, a skilled
workforce of 14 million people, business-friendly economic policies and abundant quality of
life”).
29.
Michael Haugen, Ten Years of Criminal Justice Reform in Texas, RIGHT ON
CRIME (Aug. 1, 2017), https://rightoncrime.com/2017/08/ten-years-of-criminal-justicereform-in-texas/ [https://perma.cc/28WQ-MV4U] (describing states adopting justice
reinvestment packages similar to the ones in Texas).
30.
See Jolie McCullough, As the Texas Prison Population Shrinks, the State Is
Closing Two More Lockups, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 21, 2020, 8:43 AM),
https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/2020/02/21/361405/as-the-texas-prisonpopulation-shrinks-the-state-is-closing-two-more-lockups/ [https://perma.cc/GTL8-BD5P]
(describing how in 2020, for example, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice projected
that closing two Texas prisons would “free up about $20 million in its budget”); see also
Brandi Grissom, With Crime, Incarceration Rates Falling, Texas Closes Record Number of
Prisons,
DALL.
MORNING
NEWS
(July
5,
2017,
12:41
PM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2017/07/05/with-crime-incarceration-ratesfalling-texas-closes-record-number-of-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/R2ZS-5WM5] (estimating
that Texas could “eliminate more than 2,000 beds . . . [and] save the state some $49.5 million”
from closing four prisons).
31.
From 148,988 people to 119,707 people. This excludes participants in the
Substance Abuse Felony Program. See Statistical Reports, TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST. (2020,
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over the same period, according to repository consortium SEARCH. 32 There are 5
million people in Texas’s database of people with convictions. Before the law was
reformed in 2020, 1.4 million Texans, or 5% of the population, had suspended
licenses.33 As such, the extent to which people with records and suspended licenses
are integrated into the workforce—or not—has significant consequences for the
Texas economy.

Sources: Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Annual Statistical Reports for

2005)
at
8
(all
reports
as
of
Jan.
21,
2022,
available
at
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/publications/statistical_reports.html).
32.
Data from bi-annual Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems,
SEARCH (2020, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2018, 2020) at Table 1 (2020 report
available, e.g., at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/255651.pdf). In 2006, the
repository had 7,986,300 records. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SURVEY OF
STATE
CRIMINAL
HISTORY
INFORMATION,
2006
36,
40
(Oct.
2008),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/224889.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8RV-GVB7]. In
2018, that number was 15,437,500. Becki R. Goggins & Dennis A. DeBacco, Survey of State
Criminal History Information Systems, 2018: A Criminal Justice Information Policy Report,
SEARCH 34 (Nov. 2020), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/255651.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NC3D-QBWK].
33.
At least 400,000 licenses remain suspended, though the elimination of a
controversial program restored 1.4 million licenses. Letter from Dep’t of Pub. Safety to Karly
Jo Dixon from the Tex. Fair Def. Project (on file with authors). For more on the significance
of the repeal of the controversial program, see Emily Gerrick & Mary Mergler, Commentary:
Lawmakers Need to Fix Another Problem that Buries Texas Drivers in Fines, STATESMAN
(July
5,
2020),
https://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=340640
[https://perma.cc/WM5Z-RQBN] (“We cannot overstate how significant the repeal of this
program is. When the law goes into effect in September, 1.4 million license suspensions will
be lifted, and nearly $2.5 billion of surcharge debt will be wiped clean. Huge numbers of
people will escape the cycle of suspensions and get back on the road driving legally. This
repeal will help vulnerable Texans achieve financial stability, save taxpayer dollars and boost
the Texas economy.”).
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fiscal years 2005 through 2020 (for jail and prison population data)34; SEARCH (for
criminal subjects data).35
Another reason to focus on Texas is that, over the past several decades,
Texas has introduced laws that advance both criminal justice and workforce-related
objectives, allowing individuals with old convictions to get them sealed and
individuals that have lost their licenses a chance to regain their right to drive to work
or school.36 The scale of Texas’s criminal justice system and its adoption of many
second chance reforms, as well as the lack of attention paid to their implementation,
make the state a good subject for study and analysis.
Below we provide an overview of Texas’s second chance laws, describing
their legislative history and the processes set forth by the law for obtaining relief.
These laws share the goals of advancing economic interests and removing barriers
to work, as well as preserving public safety.
A. Record Relief: Order of Nondisclosure
In Texas, every time a person is convicted of a crime, this event is
memorialized in the person’s criminal record, which sets off various “collateral
consequences,” or civil punishments that follow a person long after time has been
served. The National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction has
cataloged over 1,600 civil sanctions in Texas alone for people with criminal records
spanning child support, employment, volunteering, civic participation, real estate,
visitation and parental rights, and housing residency.37 People with certain criminal
records are disqualified from numerous top jobs for people without college degrees.
“Security Guards,” which appears on Texas Labor Analysis’s list of the top 25

34.
Data about the size of the on-hand state jail and prison population was obtained
from Statistical Reports, TEX. DEP’T CRIM. JUST. 8 (2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015,
2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2009, 2007, 2006, 2005) (reports last available on Jan.
23, 2022, https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/publications/statistical_reports.html). Even though the
TDCJ places people in jail, prison, and the Substance Abuse Felony Punishment Facility
(SAFP) Program in the same “on hand” category in its annual reports, we exclude the number
of people in the SAFP Program from our estimate of the size of the state’s prison and jail
population.
35.
Goggins & DeBacco, supra note 32, at 34, Tbl. 1 (listing the total number of
records in the state repository as of December 2018).
36.
See infra notes 43, 73.
37.
Collateral Consequences Inventory, NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES,
https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/consequences
[https://perma.cc/S95E-MY6E] (select “Texas” from dropdown).
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projected occupations without a higher education requirement for individuals,38 with
wages from approximately $21,000 to $37,000,39 is one of them.40
In an effort to give people a second chance and allow them to more easily
find employment, the Texas Legislature passed Texas Government Code Chapter
411, creating two pathways for individuals to remove their past criminal records
from public access.41 The first pathway provides relief via an expunction, which
occurs when all “information about an arrest, charge, or conviction [is removed]
from [one’]s permanent records.”42 Expunction is only available for felony and
Class A, B, and C misdemeanor nonconvictions.43 The second pathway, an OND,
seals records from the general public while allowing certain employers and
government agencies to “see through” the OND. 44 Sealing via OND is available to
people convicted of first-time, low-level misdemeanor convictions as well as to
those who completed deferred adjudication community supervision (“deferred
adjudication”) for low-level offenses.45 This article focuses only on sealing of
convictions because the earnings impact of a conviction is recognized to be much
more significant than a nonconviction.46 As such, we will use “sealing” throughout
the remainder of the article to refer exclusively to record relief granted using the
OND pathway.

38.
Top Statistics - Texas - Projections - No Education Requirement, High School
Diploma,
or
Postsecondary
Non-Degree,
TEX.
LAB.
ANALYSIS,
https://texaslaboranalysis.com/TopStatistics
[https://perma.cc/UD3T-L489]
(report
generated Aug. 27, 2021).
39.
Demand Analysis - Occupational Detail - Texas - Security Guards (SOC 339032),
TEX.
LAB.
ANALYSIS,
https://texaslaboranalysis.com/Demand
[https://perma.cc/GP6W-CVUP] (report generated Aug. 27, 2021).
40.
NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 37 (specify
“private security, investigations, and locksmiths” as a keyword).
41.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 411.072, 411.0725, 411.073, 411.0731, 411.0735,
411.074; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01.
42.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01. For more on the legislature’s intent
for expunction to redress the harm associated with criminal justice involvement, see also State
v. T.S.N, 547 S.W.3d 617, 623 (Tex. 2018) (noting that the state’s expunction statute allows
for expunction “in limited, specific circumstances . . . [with the] intent to, under certain
circumstances, free persons from the permanent shadow and burden of an arrest record, even
while requiring arrest records to be maintained for use in subsequent punishment proceedings
and to document and deter recidivism”).
43.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01.
44.
TEX. YOUNG LAW. ASS’N & STATE BAR OF TEX., Expunctions in Texas 1, 5,
(2019),
https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Our_Legal_System1&Template=/C
M/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=23459 [https://perma.cc/B23E-E2ZU]; TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN § 411.0765. Thank you to Derek Cohen of the Texas Policy Lab for raising this to
us in a comment on a previous draft.
45.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411 Subchapter E-1.
46.
See generally Robert Apel & Kathleen Powell, Level of Criminal Justice
Contact and Early Adult Wage Inequality, 5 RUSSEL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 199–200 (Jan.
2019) (providing an overview of this literature).
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In 2003, the Texas Legislature created a way for people with convictions
to obtain orders of non-disclosure (“ONDs”)47 in an effort to remove impositions on
a “person’s ability to obtain a desired job or position for many years after the
offense.”48 In 2015, the 84th Texas Legislature passed S.B. 1902 to “[give] reformed
offenders a second chance, creating a safer Texas, and increasing the workforce with
individuals who are no longer limited by their minor criminal histories” by making
sealing of deferred adjudication dismissals “automatic.” 49 This was followed two
years later by H.B. 3016, which further expanded eligibility.50
Despite these revisions, the scope of Texas’s record sealing law remains
narrow. Offenses that are given deferred adjudication up to a maximum duration 51
are eligible for relief following successful completion of community supervision and
dismissal.52 First-offense misdemeanor convictions, after a two-year waiting period
following sentence completion, are also generally eligible as long as there have been
no prior convictions or deferred adjudications.53 First-time driving while intoxicated
(“DWI”) offenses are eligible after a two-to-five-year waiting period.54 Disqualified
offenses, or those that are subject to longer waiting periods, include: violence
besides simple assault, sex crimes, and a handful of other crimes,55 as well as
offenses that have been committed by individuals who have been convicted of
certain crimes.56
There are two processes people can use to apply for record sealing. The
first process, the petition route, is used for convictions, most misdemeanors, and
47.
Id.
48.
Royce West, C.S.S.B. 1477 Bill Analysis, SENATE RSCH. CTR. 1 (May 8, 2003),
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/78R/analysis/pdf/SB01477S.pdf#navpanes=0
[https://perma.cc/WEM7-4VUH].
49.
Charles Perry, S.B. 1902 Bill Analysis, SENATE RSCH. CTR. 1 (Apr. 17, 2015),
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/84R/analysis/pdf/SB01902I.pdf#navpanes=0
[https://perma.cc/CPA9-6DFM].
50.
Senfronia Thompson et al., C.S.H.B. 3016 Bill Analysis, SENATE RSCH. CTR.
(May
18,
2017),
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/85R/analysis/pdf/HB03016S.pdf#navpanes=0
[https://perma.cc/24B5-R2K2].
51.
A maximum of two years of community supervision following misdemeanors
and ten years of community supervision for a felony. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
42A.103.
52.
Id. art. 42A.102; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.0725.
53.
GOV’T §§ 411.073, 411.0735. Some convictions have a shorter waiting period,
but for simplicity and to be conservative, we do not model these shorter periods, as described
in the Appendix.
54.
§ 411.0736.
55.
See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.06 (boating while intoxicated); see also
id. § 49.05 (flying while intoxicated); § 49.065 (assembling or operating an amusement ride
while intoxicated); id. tit. 11, Ch. 71 (organized crime).
56.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.0735(c-1). People are ineligible to have their
records sealed if they have ever been convicted of or received deferred adjudication for
offenses including homicide, human trafficking, aggravated kidnapping, child or elder abuse,
stalking, and offenses that require registration as a sex offender. Id. § 411.074(b). Payment of
legal financial obligations, if required for sentence completion, is also required. Id. §§
411.0735(b), 411.0736(b).
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felonies given deferred adjudication.57 The petition process starts with an individual
submitting a petition and a fee to the “clerk of the court . . . that sentenced [them] or
placed [them] on community supervision . . . or deferred adjudication . . . .”58
Although the filing fee can vary by county,59 “the petition must be accompanied by
payment of a fee that generally applies to the filing of a civil petition.”60 After
submitting a petition, the court holds a trial to determine whether the petitioner is
eligible for sealing and whether sealing the petitioner’s record “is in the best interests
of justice.”61 If the court answers both questions affirmatively, relief is granted, and
the record is sealed.62
The second process for sealing one’s record––the submission route––is
used only for nonviolent first-time misdemeanor offenses that received a deferred
adjudication community supervision sentence that was completed and dismissed on
or after September 1, 2017.63 The submission route does not require a petition.64
Instead, to initiate the process, the applicant must “[p]resent evidence necessary to
establish that [they] are eligible to receive an order under Section 411.072,” which
typically involves filing a Letter Requesting an Order of Nondisclosure Under
Section 411.072.65 When submitting the Letter to the clerk, the applicant must also
pay a $28 fee or request a fee waiver.66 A judge will then review the evidence and
seal the record if the applicant meets the eligibility criteria. 67 Despite the procedural
differences between the two record sealing processes, both involve legal fees, court
fees, and a petition initiated by the applicant, which requires awareness of both
eligibility and the possibility of sealing.

57.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 411.0735, 411.0725. See also An Overview of
Orders
of
Nondisclosure,
TEX.
OFF.
CT.
ADMIN.
3,
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1454238/overview-of-orders-of-nondisclosure-2022.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QB5Q-L4Y5] (Feb. 2022); TEX. OFF. CT. ADMIN., What is an Order of
Nondisclosure and How Do I Get One?, TEX. L. HELP, https://texaslawhelp.org/article/whatis-a-nondisclosure-order-and-how-do-i-get-one [https://perma.cc/C384-SXKK].
58.
TEX. OFF. CT. ADMIN., supra note 57, at 2, 14.
59.
Orders of Nondisclosure Overview, TEX. OFF. CT. ADMIN. 5 (Apr. 2017),
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/821650/order-of-nondisclosure-overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RZZ5-SZNP].
60.
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 411.0745(b).
61.
Texas: Restoration of Rights & Record Relief, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
RES. CTR. (Feb. 3, 2022), https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/texasrestoration-of-rights-pardon-expungement-sealing/ [https://perma.cc/G7B8-CTED].
62.
Id.
63.
TEX. OFF. CT. ADMIN., supra note 57, at 10.
64.
Id. at 10–11; see also Paul Saputo, Texas Criminal Law: Orders of
Nondisclosure, SAPUTO L., https://saputo.law/criminal-law/record-clearing/orders-ofnondisclosure/ [https://perma.cc/2ZEA-X4R7] (also explaining that although some call this
type of OND “automated,” this is misleading because an individual must still initiate the
process).
65.
TEX. OFF. CT. ADMIN., supra note 57, at 11.
66.
Id. at 11–12.
67.
Id. at 11.
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B. Driver’s License Restoration: Occupational Driver’s License
In Texas, individuals can lose their licenses for a variety of reasons, from
minor (e.g., not having insurance, outdated registration, or not signaling68) to serious
(e.g., “a habitually reckless or negligent operator of a motor vehicle” 69) driving
offenses. Individuals can also lose their driver’s license for non-driving-related
reasons, such as “fail[ing] to appear for a citation or fail[ing] to satisfy a judgment
ordering the payment of a fine [or fee].”70 Once an individual loses their driver’s
license, that person is faced with a difficult choice: find alternatives for basic tasks
like driving to work or school or risk further criminalization if caught driving
without a license.71
To redress the productivity-related harms associated with not having a
driver’s license,72 Texas Transportation Code § 521 Subchapter L allows certain
individuals to apply for an ODL to regain the right to drive to work and school.73
The legislative history suggests that the goal of providing ODLs was to support
employment. For instance, in 1969, Senator William T. Moore noted that “[t]he law
relating to driver’s licenses is now discriminatory in that it deprives many persons
of the privilege of following their occupations and earning a living.” 74 S.B. 743,
which “provide[d] for the issuance of an occupational license to certain people who
have had their license suspended,” followed.75 In 2015, the 84th Legislature passed
H.B. 2246 to balance the need for public safety, vis-a-vis individuals with licenses
suspended due to past intoxication, with the desire to help such individuals “continue

68.
Chris Abel, Failure to Appear and Traffic Violations, ABEL L. FIRM,
https://www.flowermoundcriminaldefense.com/failure-appear-and-traffic-violations
[https://perma.cc/G8PK-4SJ4].
69.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.292(a)(2). See also Driver’s License
Enforcement
Actions,
TEX.
DEP’T
PUB.
SAFETY,
https://www.dps.texas.gov/internetforms/Forms/DL-176.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X8P8F8WV] (listing the reasons individuals can have their licenses revoked, suspended, and/or
disqualified).
70.
Failure to Appear/Failure to Pay Program, TEX. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY,
https://www.dps.texas.gov/section/driver-license/failure-appearfailure-pay-program
[https://perma.cc/K99D-JBSQ].
71.
Driven By Debt, TEX. APPLESEED & TEX. FAIR DEF. PROJECT (Dec. 13, 2018),
https://web.archive.org/web/20210603033032/https://report.texasappleseed.org/driven-bydebt/ [https://perma.cc/H85X-ALUP].
72.
As recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971).
73.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 521.241–521.242.
74.
William T. Moore, S.B. 753 Bill Analysis, SENATE RSCH. CTR. 8 (May 7,
1969),
https://lrl.texas.gov/LASDOCS/61R/SB743/SB743_61R.pdf#page=8
[https://perma.cc/8F55-3BB7].
75.
Id.
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to support themselves and their families.”76 To effect this goal, ODLs were made
available to individuals who installed an ignition interlock device in their vehicles.77
A more recent, related development to restore driver’s licenses was the
2019 repeal of the Driver’s Responsibility Program (“DRP”), which controversially
imposed large fines for often minor traffic offenses (e.g., speeding or driving without
insurance) to fund trauma centers in rural areas.78 The program’s end resulted in the
restoration of thousands of licenses.79 However, according to the ACLU, “an
estimated 500,000 individuals’ licenses remained suspended after their DRP
surcharges were eliminated,”80 a figure consistent with the data reported in this
study.
To obtain an ODL under Texas Transportation Code § 521 Subchapter L,
one must demonstrate “an essential need” for the ODL, for example, the need to

76.
Jason Villalba et al., H.B. 2246 Bill Analysis, SENATE RSCH. CTR. (May 18,
2015),
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/84R/analysis/pdf/HB02246E.pdf#navpanes=0
[https://perma.cc/U4ED-Y9YP].
77.
W. Clay Abbott, Legislative Changes to the Occupational Driver’s License
Statutes,
TEX.
DIST.
&
CNTY.
ATT’YS
ASS’N
(Sept.–Oct.
2015),
https://www.tdcaa.com/journal/legislative-changes-to-the-occupational-drivers-licensestatutes/ [https://perma.cc/3G2W-Z7F4]. See also TRANSP. § 521.244(e)(1), (2) (creating
OND eligibility based on evidence of financial responsibility and proof of the installation of
an ignition interlock device on each motor vehicle operated by the individual).
78.
Morgan Smith, To Pay for Trauma Centers, State Program Sinks Thousands
of Texas Drivers Into Deep
Debt, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/08/27/pay-trauma-centers-texas-sinks-thousandsdrivers-deep-debt/ [https://perma.cc/SMD6-54VX] (describing how the program, originally
intended to “hold bad drivers responsible for the damage they caused, with the license
suspensions having the added benefit of keeping them off the roads” was eventually seen as
a “massive failure”). See also Matthew Menendez et al., The Steep Costs of Criminal Justice
Fees and Fines: A Fiscal Analysis of Three States and Ten Counties, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
26 (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/steep-costscriminal-justice-fees-and-fines [https://perma.cc/Z49F-Z897].
79.
Payton Weidman, TOP 19: Ending of Driver Responsibility Program Clears
Way for 1.5M Licenses to be Restored in Texas, CBS (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://www.cbs19.tv/article/news/ending-of-driver-responsibility-program-clears-way-for15m-licenses-to-be-restored-in-texas/501-171e294f-a9cf-46ba-822b-7c600e312f27
[https://perma.cc/74J6-EKNX] (estimating that following the DRP repeal, about 635,000
Texans would automatically have their licenses restored, 350,000 would have their licenses
restored after paying a reinstatement fee, and 398,000 “will be eligible to have their
suspensions lifted after they resolve other non-DRP reasons for their license suspensions,
such as failure to pay or appear”); see also DRP Repeal Allows More Than 1.6 Million People
to Drive Again, TEX. ASS’N OF CNTYS. (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.county.org/News/CountyIssues/2019/November/DRP-Repeal-Allows-More-Than-1-6-Million-People
[https://perma.cc/PXQ8-3NZL] (noting that when the program ended on September 1, 2019,
“more than 1.6 million people have become eligible to apply for their driver’s license.”).
80.
Repeal of the Driver’s Responsibility Program, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclutx.org/en/know-your-rights/repeal-driver-responsibilityprogram&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1655359165007038&usg=AOvVaw3LvA2V_M7briax
vjwxxlXd [https://perma.cc/9B99-RH6A].
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drive to work or to school and a lack of an alternative transportation option. 81
However, individuals are ineligible for ODLs if they have “lost [their] driving
privileges because of a mental or physical disability,” have “lost [their] driving
privileges for failure to pay child support,” have “received two ODLs in the past 10
years after a conviction,” or “have a ‘hard suspension’ waiting period due to a prior
DWI arrest or conviction.”82 ODLs are also unavailable to individuals who need a
license to drive a commercial motor vehicle.83
To obtain an ODL, an eligible individual must complete a petition in
accordance with local court requirements.84 Next, the applicant must file the petition
and submit a filing fee.85 If the applicant’s license was “automatically suspended or
canceled following a conviction, [the applicant should] file the Petition in the same
court that convicted [him or her].”86 If not, the applicant can choose to file the
petition “in the county where [the applicant] live[s] or where the offense occurred.”87
Following filing, there is a hearing where a judge reviews the petition and other
paperwork of the petitioner, including a Certified Abstract of the petitioner’s full
driving record, an SR-22 Proof of Insurance from the petitioner’s insurance
company, and evidence that the petitioner needs the license to go to work, attend
school, etc.88 The judge will then decide whether to grant an ODL. 89
C. Barriers to Relief Under Texas’s Second Chance Laws
As discussed above, Texas enacted its record sealing and driver’s
relicensing laws with the goals of reducing the size of the criminal justice system
and increasing access to second chances and workforce opportunities.90 However,
three administrative burdens placed on applicants by these laws limit the
legislature’s success in meeting these goals:91 first, the petition process in both cases
81.
Texas
Occupational
Driver’s
License
1,
https://www.co.chambers.tx.us/upload/page/0100/docs/Occupational%20DL/BrochureODL.
pdf [https://perma.cc/EJF4-F5B4].
82.
Id.; see generally Occupational Driver’s License, TEX. L. HELP,
https://texaslawhelp.org/guide/occupational-driverslicense/?toggle=1&toggle=2&toggle=3&toggle=4&toggle=5 [https://perma.cc/N2FJ-LZ7V]
(last updated Apr. 13, 2022) (providing additional information on “hard suspension” waiting
periods).
83.
Texas Occupational Driver’s License, supra note 81, at 1.
84.
See id. at 2.
85.
See id. at 3 (stating “if you filed an Affidavit of Indigency to waive the court
filing fees, the court may require proof of income & expenses”); TEX. L. HELP,
https://texaslawhelp.org/guide/occupational-drivers-license?tab=1&toggle=6&toggle=9
[https://perma.cc/RTC4-LJMC] (“Fill out this form only if you have a low-income, receive
public assistance because you have a low income, or cannot pay the court filing fee.”).
86.
Texas Occupational Driver’s License, supra note 81, at 3.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Supra Part I.A and B.
91.
See generally Julian Christensen et al., Human Capital and Administrative
Burden: The Role of Cognitive Resources in Citizen-State Interactions, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
127 (2020) (describing the ways in which “citizens with lower levels of human capital”
experience greater administrative burdens, which contributes to reinforcing inequality);
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requires an individual not only to prove they deserve a second chance but also to
ascertain the law and fill out potentially confusing paperwork; second, the
requirement that individuals seeking a second chance attend a hearing similarly
burdens people with challenges ranging from getting a hearing on the calendar
(which requires successfully submitting a petition) to attending a hearing (which can
involve taking time off of work, traveling, etc.); and third, complex criteria that
frequently evolve make it difficult for individuals to keep up with the law and
determine their eligibility. These painstaking and administratively difficult
processes not only stand in stark contrast with the automaticity of negative collateral
consequences after a conviction or the suspension of a driver’s license, they also
contribute to the gap in delivery of record cleaning and license restoration, as
quantified in the next Part.
II. ESTIMATING THE SIZE OF TEXAS’S SEALING AND DRIVER’S
LICENSE RESTORATION SECOND CHANCE GAPS92
While Texas legislatures have passed second chance laws to advance a
variety of goals, the benefits of second chance relief depend on the delivery of one’s
second chance. In this part, we estimate the “second chance gap” between eligibility
and delivery of second chances. We begin below by profiling the people in each
target population. Analyzing criminal convictions data from the state, we find
individuals with convictions on average to be of working age (mid-40s) and have a
last conviction from over a decade ago. The available evidence suggests that people
with suspended licenses appear to be younger on average (30–40 years old) and have
their licenses suspended on average for five years and seven months.93
To ascertain the number of people eligible to have their convictions
sealed,94 we applied a simplified version of the sealing law to criminal conviction
records to estimate the size of Texas’s “second chance sealing gap” and “second
chance driver restoration gap.”95 Based on our analysis, we estimate that about
670,000 people are able to have their records cleared, 59,000 people completely, to
PAMELA HERD & DONALD P. MOYINHAN, ADMIN. BURDEN: POLICYMAKING BY OTHER MEANS
(2018) (arguing that administrative burdens are conscious policy choices); Elizabeth Linos et
al., Nudging Early Reduces Administrative Burden: Three Field Experiments to Improve
Code Enforcement, 39 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 243 (Winter 2020) (using a field
experiment to demonstrate that learning costs, compliance costs, and psychological costs help
to explain why residents do not always take up programs for which they are eligible”); Cass
R. Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals, 68 DUKE L. J. 1843 (2019) (arguing that deregulation driven
by data and behavioral information should be undertaken due to the 9.78 billion hours of
“sludge” paperwork Americans completed in 2018 for the government, but notes that such
deregulation will be filled with numerous tradeoffs).
92.
See Colleen Chien et al., The Texas Second Chance Non-Disclosure/Sealing
Gap,
PAPER
PRISONS
INITIATIVE,
https://www.paperprisons.org/states/TX.html
[https://perma.cc/7W8G-E2BH].
93.
Infra Tbl. A, p. 696.
94.
See Chien, supra note 23.
95.
See What Is the “Second Chance Gap”?, PAPER PRISONS INITIATIVE
https://paperprisons.org/SecondChanceGap.html [https://perma.cc/5HX5-WXGC] (defining
a second chance gap as “the difference between eligibility and delivery of a person’s second
chance”).
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achieve a “clean slate” under existing law (Table 1). For this eligible population, the
average number of years since the last conviction is about 17 (median = 15 years).
Furthermore, 430,000 people appear eligible to apply for an ODL to drive to work
or school. These numbers translate into a 5% and 17% uptake rate of sealing and
driver’s license reinstatements, respectively (Table 1).
A. The Texas Criminal Population That Could Benefit from Sealing Relief
Before estimating the size of the population entitled to second chance
relief, it is worth considering the current size and characteristics of the existing
Texas criminal population, as reflected in the dataset upon which we rely for our
records sealing analysis: the Texas Computerized Criminal History System
(“CCH”). Maintained by the Texas Department of Public Safety, the CCH is a
database containing all publicly available convictions for adults from 1976 to the
date of extraction.96 This database is quite large, containing over 5.2 million Texans
who have publicly available conviction records.97 However, the true size of Texas’s
current conviction population is smaller because the CCH data is not routinely
purged of individuals who are deceased. To account for this, we removed all
individuals over the age of 80 from the dataset on the basis that the average life
expectancy for Americans is about 78.8 years.98 After doing so, we estimate that
approximately 4.8 million Texans (22% of the state’s adult population in 2020) have
publicly available conviction records.99 This estimate is at best an approximation
because it fails to account for the thousands of people who move in and out of the
Lone Star State each year.100 This database also does not include people with
nonconviction and deferred-adjudication-only records, who are also eligible for
records relief under the law.101
96.
See generally About CCH: A Brief Guide to the Texas Computerized Criminal
History
System
(CCH),
TEX.
DEP’T
PUB.
SAFETY,
https://publicsite.dps.texas.gov/DpsWebsite/CriminalHistory/AboutCch.aspx
[https://perma.cc/FK5A-924W]; see also email from Rochelle Torres, ADB Program Support
Supervisor, Tex. Dep’t Pub. Safety, to Colleen Chien (Aug. 10, 2021) (on file with editors)
(“Computerized Criminal History (CCH) was created in 1976 and we began sending the
conviction database in 1998. A person’s criminal history is retained for 125 years from their
date of birth.”).
97.
Authors’ analysis of the CCH database.
98.
Elizabeth Arias & Jiaquan Xu, United States Life Tables, 2019, 70 NAT’L
VITAL STAT. REPS. 1 (Mar. 22, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr70/nvsr7019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N39-D4BN].
99.
America Counts Staff, Texas Added Almost 4 Million People Last Decade,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-bystate/texas-population-change-between-census-decade.html [https://perma.cc/3E4G-6PDJ].
This is approximately 16.4% of the state’s population (4.8 million divided by Texas’s adult
population in 2020, which we calculated by multiplying the size of Texas’s population in
2020 (29,145,055 people) by the percentage of the population over the age of 18 (75%)).
100.
See generally Estimates of the Total Populations of Counties and Places in
Texas for July 1, 2019 and January 1, 2020, TEX. DEMOGRAPHIC CTR. 2 (Nov. 2020),
https://demographics.texas.gov/Resources/TPEPP/Estimates/2019/2019_txpopest_county.p
df [https://perma.cc/SF8S-NU9L] (describing the methodology for counting estimates and
migratory populations).
101.
See infra App. Tbl. 2, p. 698.
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Analyzing a random sample selected from the convictions database of
150,000 people, we find that about 80% have felony convictions and 62% have
misdemeanor convictions (Appendix Table 2). The most common charges include
drug possession, driving while intoxicated, and felony burglary, as well as
misdemeanor assault causing bodily injury to a family member (Appendix Table 1).
Table 1: The Population of People in Texas with Convictions
Estimated Number of People with 4.8 million
Convictions
% Male

85%

Top Convictions - Felonies

poss cs pg 1 <1g (11.4%), DWI 3rd or
more (4.2%), burglary (3.7%)

Top Convictions - Misdemeanors

poss marij <2oz (8.3%), DWI (5.6%),
assault (3.7%)

Average Years since Last Conviction

12.6 (median = 11)

Average Age at First Conviction

28 (median =27)

Average Current Age of People with 45
Convictions
White and Latinx % of People with 69%
Convictions (share in pop = 82%)
Black % of People with Convictions 31%
(share in pop = 13%)
Asian % of People with Convictions 1%
(share in pop = 5%)
Source: Authors’ analyses based on the Texas CCH database.
Consistent with general trends102, the Texas convictions population is
overwhelmingly male. But while the average age at first conviction is 28, the
average current age of people in the sample is 45. On average, the last conviction of
each person was 12.6 years ago. From an earnings perspective, this implies that the

102.
See, e.g., Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2020, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT.
8–9
(May
2022),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XW7W-DPNH] (noting that of the roughly 62,000 defendants charged in
U.S. district courts in 2020, about 14% were female and 86% were male).
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average age of people who live with convictions in Texas overlaps with the years in
which workers typically hit their peak earnings.103
The racial disparities in Texas’s criminal justice system are significant. For
example, whereas Black people account for 13% of the state population104 and make
up 33% of the Texas prison population,105 white people make up 44% of the state
population but account for just 33% of the prison population. 106 As such, Black
people are 3.4 times more likely to be imprisoned than white people in Texas. 107 In
contrast, Latinx and Asian people are underrepresented in the prison population
relative to their representation in the population in general.108 The data we analyzed
from the Texas Department of Public Safety suggests similar disparities in the
breakdown of felony and misdemeanor convictions by race. While Black individuals
represent 13% of Texas’s population, they make up 30% of people with
misdemeanor convictions and 31% of people with felony convictions in our database
(Table 1). White and Asian people appear to be underrepresented in felony and
misdemeanor convictions relative to their representation in the population in
general.109
B. The Texas Population That Could Benefit from License Restoration Relief
In contrast to the population of people with criminal records, less is known
about the demographic characteristics of people with suspended licenses. The
populations are distinct, however, as driver’s license suspensions are administrative
penalties that, in Texas, generally follow noncompliance with court-ordered fines

103.
Julia Carpenter, Millennials’ High-Earning Years Are Here, but It Doesn’t
Feel That Way, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/millennials-highearning-years-are-here-but-it-doesnt-feel-that-way-11628769603 [https://perma.cc/4NEE7FBU] (indicating, based on figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, that workers
typically experience peak earnings “between the ages of 35 and 54”).
104.
Incarceration Trends in Texas, VERA INST. OF JUST. 1 (Dec. 2019),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trends-texas.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E6SR-UNA4].
105.
Id. at 2.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
See supra Tbl. 1, p. 692 for a snapshot of the Texas criminal population, by
race.
109.
Based on our analysis of the data received from the Texas Department of
Public Safety and statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau, Black people comprise 30% of
people with misdemeanor convictions and 31% of people with felony convictions in the
database, as compared to their approximate 13% share of the 2020 population, while white
and Asian people appear to be underrepresented in felony and misdemeanor convictions
relative to their representation in the population in general. Quick Facts: Texas, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/TX [https://perma.cc/VE2P-SZDT].

694

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64:675

and fees or requests to appear.110 This means that license suspensions often impact
people who haven’t committed serious crimes111 or even been accused of them.
Other studies have considered license suspension programs in Texas, North
Carolina, and New Jersey.112 Though the details of each suspension program are
unique, the available studies described below suggest that individuals with
suspended licenses tend to come disproportionately from low-income urban
communities and that license suspensions particularly harm the Black community.
Carnegie et al.’s study of New Jersey drivers from 2007 reports that “only
16.5 percent of New Jersey licensed drivers reside in lower income zip codes, while
43 percent of all suspended drivers live there.” 113 A later study by Joyce et al.114 of
all suspended licenses in New Jersey from 2004 to 2018 found that the median
household income for people with non-driving-related suspensions was about
$78,000,115 which is about $14,000 lower than the median household income of
$85,245 between 2016 and 2020.116 In contrast, the median household income for
people who did not have suspensions was nearly $105,000, about $23,000 above
110.
Notably, “[m]ost often, people are charged with a fine-only offense when they
receive a ticket written by a law enforcement officer. The ticket instructs them to pay the fine
and court costs, or alternatively, to appear in court on or by a certain date. Only people who
cannot pay immediately or want to contest the ticket must show up in court.” Deborah Fowler
et al., Pay or Stay: The High Cost of Jailing Texans for Fines & Fees, TEX. APPLESEED &
TEX.
FAIR
DEF.
PROJECT
6
(Feb.
2017),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/PayorStay_Report_final_Feb2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BB3B-5A6R].
111.
See Justin Wm. Moyer, More than 7 Million People May Have Lost Driver’s
Licenses
Because
of
Traffic
Debt,
WASH. POST
(May
19,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/more-than-7-million-people-mayhave-lost-drivers-licenses-because-of-traffic-debt/2018/05/19/97678c08-5785-11e8-b656a5f8c2a9295d_story.html [https://perma.cc/BX6T-FAJN] (noting that “[d]river’s license
suspensions were criticized by anti-poverty advocates after a 2015 federal investigation,
focused on Ferguson, Mo., revealed that law enforcement used fines to raise revenue for state
and local governments”).
112.
See generally Jon A. Carnegie et al., Driver’s License Suspensions, Impacts
and
Fairness
Study,
N.J.
DEP’T
TRANSP.
(Aug.
2007)
https://www.nj.gov/transportation/business/research/reports/FHWA-NJ-2007-020-V1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GDV3-GM33]; Nina R. Joyce et al., Individual and Geographic Variation
in Driver’s License Suspensions: Evidence of Disparities by Race, Ethnicity, and Income, 19
J. Tʀᴀɴsᴘ. & Hᴇᴀʟᴛʜ 1 (2020); Driven by Debt Dallas, TEX. FAIR DEF. PROJECT & TEX.
APPLESEED
5
(Nov.
2019),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/Driven%20By%20Debt%20Dallas.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K5Z2-K39Q]; Driven by Debt Houston, TEX. FAIR DEF. PROJECT & TEX.
APPLESEED 4 (July 2020), https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/DrivenByDebtHouston-July2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/RFP3-WDBJ]; William E. Couzier & Brandon L.
Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension in North
Carolina, 69 DUKE L. J. 1585 (2020).
113.
Carnegie et al., supra note 112, at 66.
114.
Joyce et al., supra note 112, at 6.
115.
Id.
116.
Quick
Facts:
New
Jersey,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/NJ/SBO001212
[https://perma.cc/J2HDENEY].
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New Jersey’s median household income.117 Although estimates of the average or
median income of people with suspended licenses are unavailable for Texas,
researchers for the Texas Fair Defense Project and Texas Appleseed found a
negative correlation between the number of license suspensions and household
income in both Houston118 and Dallas: “[A]s zip code income increased, the number
of holds decreased.”119
Both studies from New Jersey find people with suspended licenses are
disproportionately from urban areas. Carnegie et al. note that “[a]lthough only 43
percent of New Jersey licensed drivers reside in urban areas, 63 percent of
suspended drivers live there.”120 More recent research similarly reports that 4% of
people who had any non-driving-related suspensions lived in rural areas, compared
to 5.7% of people with no suspension.121
Racial disparities among drivers with suspended licenses are significant.
The Texas studies referenced earlier, for example, find that in Dallas, Black people
account for only 11% of the driving population and yet account for 28.6% of people
who cannot get their licenses renewed due to having a hold in OmniBase, a program
that suspends licenses for failure to pay court-related expenses or failure to appear
(“FTA”).122 A similar trend is present in Houston, where Black people make up only
22% of the city population, but comprise 40% of the people with OmniBase license
holds from the Houston Municipal Court.123 Couzier and Garrett’s study of
suspensions in North Carolina finds that Black people make up 21% of drivers and
account for 50.5% of license suspensions, whereas white people account for 65% of
drivers and 36.3% of license suspensions.124
Insofar as lost earnings are concerned, it is worth considering the age of
people with suspended licenses and the average number of years their licenses are
suspended. Couzier and Garrett’s North Carolina study finds that the average age of
people at the time of license suspension was 28 to 29, and the average length of hold
ranges from five to ten years.125 Joyce et al.’s study of all New Jersey drivers with a
117.
Joyce et al., supra note 112, at 6.
118.
See Driven by Debt Houston, supra note 112, at 5 (“The zip code with the most
holds per resident is 77026, an area in Northeast Houston covering the Kashmere Gardens
neighborhood, with 344 holds per every 1,000 residents. This zip code has more than one
third of its residents living below the poverty level and a majority of its residents (52%) are
black. The median income is over $20,000 less than the citywide median income. Profiles of
other heavily affected zip codes are similar. The ten zip codes with the highest rates of holds
all have people living in poverty at higher rates than the city’s overall poverty rate and most
have median incomes below the city’s median income. Six of these ten zip codes have a
population that is more than 50% people of color.”).
119.
Driven by Debt Dallas, supra note 112, at 5; Driven by Debt Houston, supra
note 112, at 4.
120.
Carnegie et al., supra note 112, at 66.
121.
Joyce et al., supra note 112, at 6 (also finding that 6.7% of people with drivingrelated suspensions lived in rural areas).
122.
Driven by Debt Dallas, supra note 112, at 6.
123.
Driven by Debt Houston, supra note 112, at 5.
124.
Couzier & Garrett, supra note 112, at 1607–08.
125.
Id. at 1607; see also Driven by Debt Dallas, supra note 112, at 5–6 (average
length of time with OmniBase hold was five years and seven months); Driven by Debt
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suspended license from 2004 to 2018 documented an average driver age of 39.4. 126
Most relevant for our purposes, the reports by the Texas Fair Defense Project and
Texas Appleseed report an average hold length of five years and seven months based
on 2018 data acquired from the Department of Public Safety.127 A summary of this
information is available in Table A.
Table A: Demographic Information About the Population of Texans with Suspended
Driver’s Licenses
Average
Length of Hold

Source of
Estimates

––

5 years and 7
months
(statewide
estimate from
2018 DPS
data)

Pages 5–6

New Jersey

39.4 (mean
age of people
with any
non-drivingrelated
suspension)

––

Table 1

North
Carolina

28.67
(median age
at time of
offense)

10.1 years
(median)

Table 2

Study

Jurisdiction

Age

Texas Fair
Defense Project
and Texas
Appleseed
(2019 and 2020)

Dallas and
Houston

Joyce et al.
(2020)

Crouzier and
Garrett (2020)

C. Sizing Texas’s Second Chance Sealing Gap
Having provided an overview of Texas’s criminal population, we begin by
calculating the second chance sealing gap—the difference between eligibility and
delivery of sealing relief to people with criminal convictions. We use the gap-sizing
methodology devised by one of us128 to determine the following: (1) the current
gap—the number and share of individuals with records that could qualify for relief;
Houston, supra note 112, at 4–5 (majority of OmniBase holds (57.5%) were issued more than
nine years ago); Joyce et al., supra note 112, at 6.
126.
Joyce et al., supra note 112, at 4.
127.
Driven by Debt Dallas, supra note 112, at 5; Driven by Debt Houston, supra
note 112, at 5.
128.
See Chien, supra note 23, at 542–43.
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(2) the uptake gap—the share of people eligible for a given second chance that have
obtained it129; and (3) based on the same data used to calculate the current and uptake
gaps––how many years, at current rates, it would take to clear the existing backlog.
First, we ascertained and modeled Texas’s OND law. Next, we applied the
model of the laws to a sample of criminal histories obtained from the state to identify
the number of individuals eligible for a given second chance. Once we had estimated
the number of people eligible for a given second chance, we calculated the “current
gap,” the uptake rate, and the pace of record relief using the following steps. To
estimate the current gap, we divided the number of people eligible for a given second
chance by the number of people in our sample. To estimate the population eligible
for relief, we multiplied the current gap by the total population, which was estimated
using state data. Next, using the Texas Computerized Criminal History System
convictions database from the state described previously in Part II.A., we calculated
the estimated relief granted over the past five to ten years by adding the number of
second chances granted to the product of (i) the number of second chances granted
in the earliest year of data and (ii) the number of years left to reach five or ten years
of data (whichever was closest to the actual number of years of data the state
provided). Then, to calculate the uptake rate, we divided the estimated historical
relief rate by the number of people eligible for relief plus the estimated historical
relief rate. After calculating the current gap and the uptake gap, we estimated the
number of years it would take to clear the backlog by dividing the population eligible
for relief by the number of people who were granted a second chance in the most
recent full year of data.
There are several weaknesses with our methodology. First, we do not
account for eligibility requirements related to fines and fees due to a lack of data,
making our estimates potentially generous. Our database also does not permit the
removal of people who have died or moved out of state. In the other direction, we
also do not include eligibility for expungements of nonconvictions, which depress,
potentially dramatically, our estimates of the number of people that fall into the
records relief gap. Second, the underlying criminal history provided by the state at
times was missing sentence expiration dates. When that data was missing, we
inferred expiration dates based on data where expiration dates were present.130
Finally, as detailed in the Appendix, certain eligibility provisions contained
ambiguities that we were unable to resolve despite multiple consultations with local
criminal law experts.131 These challenges introduce inaccuracies that cause our
estimates to be both over- and under-inclusive.

129.
Id. at 541–42.
130.
Based on our analysis, we assumed expiration date equaled sentence start date
plus 2.9 years for misdemeanors and 3.2 years for felonies. See infra App. A(1), p. 718.
131.
See id.
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Table 2: Estimated Eligibility and Uptake of Texas Record Sealing and Drivers
Restoration
Order of
Nondisclosure
(Sealing)

Occupational
Driver’s License
(Restoration)

Total Population (Eligible + Ineligible)

4,826,860

N/A

Population Eligible for Relief

676,845

438,000

Population Eligible for a Clean Record
(No Conviction)

58,501

N/A

Relief Granted in Last Available Year

2,650 (2019)

16,350 (2019)

Estimated Relief Granted

36,409 (10 years)

87,027 (5 years)

Uptake Rate (Estimated Share of
People Eligible for a Given Second
Chance That Have Obtained It)

~5%

~17%

Years It Would Take to Clear the
Backlog

255

27

Current Gap (Estimated Share of All
People with Records That Are Eligible
for Relief)

14%

N/A

Based on taking the steps described above,132 we estimate that around
677,000 people with misdemeanor convictions or deferred adjudications are eligible
for sealing relief under Texas Government Code Chapter 411 and 59,000 for a clean
record. We further find that 18,593 people had their records sealed between fiscal
years 2014 and 2019. Based on this, we project that, at most, about 36,000 people
sealed their records over the past ten years. Combining these historical figures with
our eligibility calculations, we estimate that approximately 5% of people eligible for
relief have received it, leaving 95% of people in the “Texas Second Chance Sealing
Gap.” Based on administrative data, 2,650 people sealed their records in the last year

132.

Id.
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of available data (2019).133 At this rate, it would take 255 years to clear the sealing
backlog. The profile of individuals that could get a “cleaner” or “completely
cleaned” record is similar to that of the average profile of a person with a conviction,
except that the average years since the last conviction is 17 and 19 years,
respectively.134
D. Sizing Texas’s Second Chance Driver’s License Restoration Gap
We applied a similar “second chance gap” approach to quantifying the
number of people in Texas who appear eligible for but have not received an
occupational driver’s license “restoration” based on Texas Transportation Code §
521 Subchapter L.135 Doing so requires an understanding of how driver’s licenses
are suspended in Texas in the first place. Practitioners have generally described two
main, non-driving-related causes of a license suspension: failure to pay criminal
court-related fines, fees, and surcharges; and failure to appear (“FTA”).136 FTAs in
Texas result, in turn, when a person is summoned to court for a range of offenses,
ranging from traffic citations to felonies, but does not appear for their trial or
hearing.137 The consequences can be severe. For instance, FTA can result in the
issuance of an arrest warrant.138 Individuals can also lose their driver’s license under
Texas Transportation Code 706, which allows the state to “deny renewal of the
driver’s license of a person who fails to appear for a complaint or citation or fails to
pay or satisfy a judgment ordering payment of a fine and cost . . . in a matter
involving any [criminal] offense.”139
Using this as a foundation, we focus on people who lost their licenses under
the OmniBase Program, which suspends licenses for failure to pay court-related

133.
Email from Linda Boline, Sr. Manager, Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, to Emily
Gerrick, Pol’y Dir., Tex. Fair Def. Project (Sept. 29, 2020, 02:32 CST) (on file with authors);
see infra App. Tbl. 7, p. 728 (“Breakdown of Record Relief Granted Per Year in Texas”
provides annual sealing data from the Department of Public Safety).
134.
See infra App. A. Tbl. 1, p. 722.
135.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 521.241–521.53 (West) (Subchapter L
Occupational License).
136.
See Driven by Debt, supra note 71; Driven by Debt: The Failure of the
Omnibase Program, TEX. APPLESEED & TEX. FAIR DEF. PROJECT 3 (Aug. 2021),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/OmniBaseRevenueReport-Aug11Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6R3-BPTA] (“Holds on license renewals are triggered when
license holders either fail to pay fines and costs or fail to appear in court, usually for traffic
offenses. However, eventually all OmniBase Holds are incurred due to an inability to pay
because the only way to lift a hold is to completely pay off all underlying debt”); Driven by
Debt Dallas, supra note 112, at 1 (“The vast majority of criminal cases in Texas are fine-only
misdemeanors, which are the lowest level of criminal offenses in Texas and intended to be
punished by fines alone and no jail time. Fine-only misdemeanors include most traffic
offenses, city ordinance violations and other Class C misdemeanors such as public
intoxication.”).
137.
See Fowler et al., supra note 110 and accompanying text.
138.
Id. at 7.
139.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 706.004 (West 2021).
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expenses or FTA.140 We acquired data provided by the Texas Department of Public
Safety to ascertain the number of people that presumably met the FTA criteria for
ODL relief by virtue of having an FTA on their driver’s license, which was 438,000
individuals.141 To complement our analysis, we relied on statistics from the
Department of Public Safety on the number of people who received an ODL under
the OmniBase Program, which reports that 47,449 ODLs were granted between
September 2017 and February 2020.142
There are a few limitations to our approach. First, we were unable to obtain
data by which we could determine the bases for license suspension and, therefore,
could not model the “inability to pay” criteria.143 We excluded people qualifying for
occupational licenses based on these criteria from our estimate, depressing it. That
said, we note that there is likely substantial overlap between the universe of
individuals who qualify under each criterion, particularly because a major cause of
an FTA is a lack of transportation to attend one’s hearing.144 Second, we did not
model the requirement for receiving an ODL of having driver’s insurance because
we do not have access to this information. In operation, this requirement is likely to
act as a significant hurdle to ODL restoration by the subset of people with FTAs that
are based on poverty.145 Additionally, although individuals with FTAs are unlikely
to have the traits in general which would disqualify them for ODL relief,146 it
remains the case that “a small percentage [of the people who have an FTA] may
have other suspensions that make them ineligible for an ODL, such as [that their
license was] also revoked for a medical reason, a hard suspension/waiting period
because of an alcohol or drug offense, or their driver license is revoked because of

140.
Failure to Appear/Failure to Pay Program, TEX. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY,
https://www.dps.texas.gov/section/driver-license/failure-appearfailure-pay-program
[https://perma.cc/GX4R-EJZC]; see also TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 706.004.
141.
Email from Linda Boline to Emily Gerrick, supra note 133.
142.
See Driver License Division High Value Set, TEX. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY,
https://www.dps.texas.gov/section/driver-license/driver-license-division-high-value-datasets [https://perma.cc/27UT-LMFG]. Data used from: Feb. 2020, Jan. 2020, Dec. 2019, Nov.
2019, Oct. 2019, Sept. 2019, Aug. 2019, July 2019, June 2019, May 2019, Apr. 2019, Mar.
2019, Feb. 2019, Jan. 2019, Dec. 2018, Nov. 2018, Oct. 2018, Sept. 2018, Aug. 2018, July
2018, June 2018, May 2018, Apr. 2018, Mar. 2018, Feb. 2018, Jan. 2018, Dec. 2017, Nov.
2017, Oct. 2017, Sept. 2017.
143.
Driven by Debt, supra note 71.
144.
See Fowler et al., supra note 110, at 7; see also Driven by Debt: The Failure
of the Omnibase Program, supra note 136, at 1 (“Holds on license renewals are triggered
when license holders either fail to pay fines and costs or fail to appear in court, usually for
traffic offenses. However, eventually all OmniBase Holds are incurred due to an inability to
pay, because the only way to lift a hold is to completely pay off all underlying debt.”).
145.
See Fowler et al., supra note 110, at 5–6.
146.
For example, on the basis of hard suspension waiting periods due to DWIs,
which are Class B misdemeanors or more serious offenses. See Know Your Rights: Traffic
Tickets and Other Class C Misdemeanors, ACLU TEX., https://www.aclutx.org/en/knowyour-rights/know-your-rights-traffic-tickets-and-other-class-c-misdemeanors
[https://perma.cc/XNK2-5RVX]; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (statute for DWI);
Id. § 49.06 (statute for driving a boat while intoxicated).
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non-payment of child support.”147 Once again, these methodological weaknesses
cause us to both underestimate and overestimate the second chance driver’s license
restoration gap.
Based on the methods, data sources, and caveats described above and
further elaborated in the Appendix, we estimate that around 438,000 people with
suspended licenses in Texas due to FTA are eligible for an occupational driver’s
license.148 Using the data sources described above, we project that the Texas
Department of Public Safety granted 87,027 ODLs over the past five years.
Combining these historical ODL figures with our eligibility calculations, we
estimate that 16.58% of people eligible for relief have received it, leaving 83.42%
of people in the “Texas Second Chance Driving Relicensing Gap.” Based on
reported records, the state granted 16,350 ODLs in the last year of fully available
data (2019).149 At this rate, it would take nearly three decades (27 years) to clear the
ODL backlog.

III. THE EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS IMPACTS OF TEXAS’S
SECOND CHANCE GAPS
A. Summary of Results
Employment and earning opportunities are limited for persons who have
criminal records or who lack driver’s licenses compared to those without such
restrictions. Though second chance laws make it possible to remove these barriers
to work through record sealing or license restoration, our analysis of Texas’s
criminal justice system in the previous Part finds that only a fraction of those
apparently eligible for relief are accessing it, with over a million people falling into
either the second chance sealing or occupational driver’s license gap. While second
chance reforms are often generally motivated by a desire to expand economic
opportunity, no study of which we are aware has yet attempted to specify the cost to
society, in aggregate earnings and employment losses, associated with the second
chance gap. The following paragraphs detail our attempts to do so, with the results
of our analysis shown in Table 3 below.

147.
Email with contact at Tex. Fair Def. Project (on file with authors); Texas
Occupational Driver’s License, supra note 81, at 1.
148.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 521.241–521.53 (described in Part I.B).
149.
Infra App. Tbl. 7, p. 728 (basing our estimate on 2019 rather than 2020 data
due to COVID).
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Table 3: The Size and Annual Earnings Losses Associated with Texas’s Second
Chance Sealing and Driver’s License Gaps
Orders of Nondisclosure
Driver’s License Restoration
Estimate of Annual Wage
Loss
$5,100

Estimate of Annual
Wage Loss (Lower
Bounds Estimate)

$12,696

People Estimated in the
Second Chance ODL Gap
(Total Clearance)
676,845

Estimate of Annual
Wage Loss (Upper
Bounds Estimate)

$23,552

People Estimated in
the Second Chance
ODL Gap (Total
Clearance)

438,000

Estimate of Annual
Earnings Loss

$3.5B

Estimate of Annual
Earnings Loss (Lower
Bounds)
$5.6B
Estimate of Annual
Earnings Loss (Upper
Bounds)
$10.3B

B. Estimating the Earnings Effect of Incarceration and Conviction
A great deal of empirical work on the impact of contact with the criminal
legal system on employment and earnings is limited to incarceration, although a
growing body of studies is beginning to push the point of contact up to conviction
and even arrest.150 There are challenges with these kinds of studies, namely,
adjusting for the distinct possibility that individuals who have contact with the
criminal legal system would experience employment problems or wage erosion even
in the absence of that contact. This is known as the selection problem, and it is
exemplified by socioeconomic profiles indicating that individuals who have contact
with the criminal legal system tend to be drawn from lower rungs of the
socioeconomic ladder. For example, Harlow reports that just 35% of state prison
inmates have a high school diploma, compared to 82% of the general population that
had finished the 12th grade.151 It is for this reason that Wakefield and Uggen
characterize the criminal legal system partly as a social filter that absorbs marginal
150.
See, e.g., Apel & Powell, supra note 46, at 198, 199–200 (presenting a
literature review about key studies related to lost earnings and criminal justice contact and
noting “[t]his rich research tradition is mixed with respect to legal jurisdictions, types of
contact, age and representativeness of the samples, measurement sources, research designs,
and methodological rigor”).
151.
Caroline Wolf Harlow, Education and Correctional Populations (NCJ
195670), BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 3 (Jan. 2003), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P57C-QNJR].
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and marginalized populations.152 Furthermore, individuals who experience more
punitive forms of contact with the criminal legal system (e.g., conviction with
incarceration as opposed to conviction with probation) tend to have even more
disadvantaged profiles.153 This would seem to call into question whether
employment difficulty could be interpreted as the causal effect of contact with the
criminal legal system experience or a spurious artifact. Despite that challenge, many
studies have taken great care to deal with the selection problem using several kinds
of quasi-experimental designs.154 There are many such studies, but we focus our
attention on the few that are directly relevant to our purpose.
Studies of large national surveys in the United States consistently indicate
incarceration, even a very short spell of confinement, is highly disruptive to an
individual’s employment prospects. Apel and Ramakers review many of them and
conclude that formerly incarcerated individuals have a 10–20% lower likelihood of
employment than their non-incarcerated peers.155 This means that if the baseline
employment-to-population ratio is 60%, individuals who have been incarcerated
have a comparable ratio of 48–54%.156 Moreover, among individuals who are
employed, the wage gap tends to be on the order of 5–30%, meaning when judged
against a baseline wage of $10 per hour, otherwise similar, but formerly incarcerated
individuals who find employment earn $7–$9.50 per hour.157 Assuming a 40-hour
work week, this would amount to a penalty of $1,040 to $6,240 per year, compared
to an annual baseline of $20,800.158
The “disruption” effect of incarceration is distinct from, but in many cases,
further compounded by, the “marking” effect of having a criminal record––in
particular, a conviction––on earnings and employment. Craigie and her coauthors
provide the most recent estimates of the impact of misdemeanor and felony
convictions and incarceration on earnings, which we use as a starting point.159 They
rely on self-reported criminal justice contact in a large, representative, and
longitudinal sample of individuals who were in their 30s the last time they were
interviewed.160 Their design entails matching individuals who experienced criminal
justice contact to their peers who share the same demographic profile and regional
152.
Sara Wakefield & Christopher Uggen, Incarceration and Stratification, 36
ANN. REV. SOCIO. 387, 388–91 (2010).
153.
Id. at 392; see also Reducing Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System:
A Manual for Policymakers and Practitioners, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 1, 15 (2008)
(discussing causes of racial disparity in the criminal justice system, how these disparities
manifest, and what practitioners and policymakers can do to address these disparities).
154.
See, e.g., Apel & Powell, supra note 46, at 198.
155.
Robert Apel & Anke Ramakers, Impact of Incarceration on Employment
Prospects, 3 HANDBOOK ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT DECISIONS
85, 90 (2018).
156.
See id.
157.
Id.
158.
See id.
159.
Terry-Anne Craigie et al., Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings: How
Involvement with the Criminal Justice System Deepens Inequality, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/convictionimprisonment-and-lost-earnings-how-involvement-criminal [https://perma.cc/9LBT-P4EA].
160.
Id. at 31–32.
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economic characteristics but who did not experience criminal justice contact. 161
They estimate lost annual earnings due to misdemeanor convictions to be $5,100,
which is a 16% difference relative to baseline annual earnings of $32,000, and lost
earnings from a felony conviction to be $6,400 (a 22% decline relative to a baseline
of $29,400).162 These represent the effects of misdemeanor and felony convictions
relative to no conviction, the latter mostly reflecting no criminal justice contact,
although it could include some number of individuals who experienced forms of
criminal justice processing that did not culminate in a conviction (e.g., arrest or
booking).163 Slightly larger are the lost earnings from incarceration, which the
authors estimate to be $7,100 per year (a 52% decline relative to a baseline of
$13,800).164 This estimate compares individuals who experienced any postconviction sentence of incarceration to individuals who did not experience criminal
justice contact, as well as individuals who might have experienced other forms of
criminal justice processing (possibly even those held in jail awaiting processing) but
were not sentenced to incarceration.165
The evidence that is most relevant for our purpose comes from Harris
County, Texas. Mueller-Smith takes advantage of the fact that misdemeanor and
felony defendants are randomly assigned to a courtroom, which determines both the
judge that presides over their case as well as the prosecution team.166 Because
randomization ensures there is no systematic tendency for defendants with certain
characteristics to be assigned to a particular courtroom, variation in incarceration
arises solely from the assigned courtroom.167 In that sense, variation in punishment
due to the preferential leanings of individual judges can be thought of as being as
good as randomly assigned. The analysis merges administrative data from law
enforcement, the court, the correctional system, and the labor department to pool
together individuals who are incarcerated for the first time with individuals who
have prior incarceration spells and to compare them to those who could have been
incarcerated but were not because they were randomly assigned to a less punitive
courtroom.168 Mueller-Smith estimates that, during incarceration, individuals
sentenced for misdemeanors and felonies are less likely to be employed by more
than 30 percentage points.169 Following incarceration, their quarterly employment
probability remains lower by 4–5 percentage points, and their quarterly earnings are
lower by 30–40% relative to their peers who were not incarcerated.170 In terms of
lost earnings, he estimates the annual earnings gap to be $1,864 due to incarceration
for a misdemeanor and $4,706 due to a two-year incarceration spell for a felony.171
As a further sign of their difficulty in attaining financial self-sufficiency following
161.
Id. at 31–33.
162.
Id. at 15.
163.
See id. at 14.
164.
Id. at 17.
165.
Id. at 17–19.
166.
Michael Mueller-Smith, The Criminal and Labor Market Impacts of
Incarceration, UNIV. OF MICH., ANN ARBOR (2015) (unpublished manuscript).
167.
Id. at 2, 7–9.
168.
Id. at 17–19.
169.
Id. at 28.
170.
Id. at 28–31.
171.
Id. at 47, Tbl. 7.
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incarceration, formerly incarcerated individuals rely more heavily on government
programs (e.g., food stamps, cash welfare, etc.) after their release. 172
A more recent study by Mueller-Smith and Schnepel focuses on two policy
changes in Harris County related to court use of diversion for certain groups of
criminal defendants: one in 1994 that reduced the use of diversion (for certain
property and drug defendants) and another in 2007 that expanded the use of
diversion (for certain low-risk defendants).173 In this study, diversion refers to
deferred adjudication of guilt, whereby defendants evade a felony conviction by
completing a period of community supervision.174 This type of sanction is akin to
probation, but whereas probation is an alternative to prison that follows a formal
conviction for low-level offenses, deferred adjudication avoids a conviction
outright.175 The study speaks directly to the impact on employment of a felony
conviction record because the marginal defendant is one who is most likely to be
sentenced to community supervision, meaning the only difference is whether they
acquire a felony conviction in the process.176 Their analysis takes advantage of the
fact that these two deferred adjudication policies were implemented abruptly—
abrupt changes like this are frequently referred to as natural experiments because
they allow comparison of individuals who would have received the same sanction
but for the policy change and who instead receive different sanctions that are
arguably as good as being randomly assigned.177 The authors estimate that
individuals who benefit from deferred adjudication have a higher quarterly
employment likelihood by at least 15 percentage points (an almost 50% increase
over baseline in both years).178 They also have substantially higher total earnings—
the authors estimate the average annual earnings loss from a felony conviction to be
as high as $8,500 (1994) and at least $4,100 (2007).179 These employment and
earnings effects are long-lasting, as they persist for ten years after deferred
adjudication and, after the 1994 change, for an astonishing 20 years. 180
In light of their careful design, these two Harris County studies provide
credible estimates of the causal impact of incarceration and conviction on
employment and earnings. What is notable about both studies is that not only do
conviction and incarceration worsen short- and long-term employment and earnings
prospects, but they also increase the likelihood of further entanglement with the
criminal legal system.181 This seems to be especially likely among individuals with
172.
Id. at 30, 32.
173.
Michael Mueller-Smith & Kevin T. Schnepel, Diversion in the Criminal
Justice System, 88 J. ECON. STUD. 883, 884–86 (2021).
174.
Id. at 883.
175.
Id. at 885.
176.
Id. at 884–85.
177.
Id.
178.
Id. at 900.
179.
Id. at 901, Tbl. 4.
180.
Id. at 883, 902.
181.
Mueller-Smith, supra note 166, at 24 (“Once defendants are released from
incarceration . . . they are more likely to be involved in criminal activity especially those
returning after longer incarceration sentences.”). Id. at 28–29 (“For each additional year of
incarceration, felony defendants were 3.6 percentage points less likely to be employed and
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no prior felony convictions, for whom the impacts of a felony conviction on
recidivism and employment are largest.182 This implies that the state of Texas pays
not only in terms of lost wage-related revenue but also in the cost of additional crime
and legal processing, as well as the cost of government programs from which
affected individuals seek relief.
Table B provides a summary of the estimates of different forms of criminal
justice sanctions on annual earnings obtained from the studies described above. The
estimates are comparable even though they derive from different samples and
different quasi-experimental designs. Our particular interest is in lost earnings from
conviction, estimates of which are broken down by misdemeanor and felony
convictions.
Table B. Estimates of Lost Annual Earnings from Conviction and Incarceration

Study

Jurisdiction

Craigie et al.
(2020)

National

Impact of
Conviction

Impact of
Incarceration

Source
of
Estimate

Misdemeanor:
$5,100

$7,100

Table 3

Misdemeanor:
$1,864

Table 7

Felony: $6,400
MuellerSmith (2015)

Harris
County, TX

––

Felony: $4,786
MuellerSmith
and
Schnepel
(2021)

Harris
County, TX

Felony (1994):
$8,536

Table 4

Felony (2007):
$4,144

Note: The felony incarceration estimate in Mueller-Smith (2015) assumes a twoyear sentence of incarceration, as he allows the impact to differ by duration of
sentence.183 The estimates from Mueller-Smith and Schnepel (2021) relate to
deferred adjudication policy reforms through which individuals are able to avoid a
conviction record by completing community supervision.184

earned 0.34 less log income.”). Id., Tbl. 6 (“Impact of incarceration on committing new types
of offenses”). Id., Tbl. 7 (“Impact of incarceration on labor market outcomes”).
182.
Mueller-Smith & Schnepel, supra note 173, at 902, 911.
183.
Mueller-Smith, supra note 166, at 12–13, 44.
184.
Mueller-Smith & Schnepel, supra note 173, at 885.
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C. Estimating the Earnings Impact of the Texas Second Chance Expungement
(Sealing) Gap
We specifically use the estimates from Craigie et al. because this is the only
study to estimate the impact of both misdemeanor and felony convictions and
because its estimate of earnings loss from a felony conviction is the midpoint of the
two estimates provided by Mueller-Smith and Schnepel.185 This leads us to conclude
the national average impact of a misdemeanor conviction on earnings is about
$5,100 per year, and the impact of a felony conviction is about $6,400 per year. The
Mueller-Smith study also relies on a control group that includes only first-time
convictions. Because studies indicate that the binary step of going from having to
not having a conviction record, or vice versa, is most significant,186 we
conservatively include in our calculation only people who would be able to seal their
records entirely of convictions—a smaller number than who could receive any relief
under sealing law. It is important to note that these studies, and our figures, are
drawn from national calculations that may not accurately predict the outcomes of
Texans with convictions.187 Thus, though we use the estimates above to carry out
our exercise, we heavily caveat its precise total for at least this reason.
Multiplying the number of individuals that could entirely clear their
records, 58,501, by $5,100 yields a conservative estimate of approximately $300
million annually in lost earnings. If we change our estimate to include all in our
sample who could get sealing relief (676,845), an approach that is consistent with
the Mueller-Smith and Schnepel research design of comparing people with various
records who received deferred adjudications with those who did not, the cumulative
annual earnings loss balloons to approximately $3.5 billion. These figures represent
forgone earnings due to having one additional criminal conviction relative to no
criminal conviction—in economic parlance, it represents lost earnings on the
extensive margin.
One might wonder whether these wages are permanently lost in light of
evidence that a criminal record stigmatizes individuals in the labor market and
sustained time out of the labor market erodes human capital even further. This
suggests that initial demand-side barriers to work have the capacity to become selfsustaining as they crystallize into experience gaps that make it even more difficult
to secure gainful employment. With respect to the latter possibility, surveys of
employers indicate they are less likely to want to hire individuals with a “spotty
work record” as opposed to individuals with only a GED, and even compared to
individuals who have been unemployed for a year or more. 188 Although employers
are least likely to want to hire someone with a criminal record, criminal record
expungement might not suffice to fully recover lost earnings because experience
gaps that accumulate over time due to the criminal record cannot be fully remedied.
Even if some employment erosion is permanent, there are compelling
reasons to believe that expungement policy can lead to the recovery of some fraction
185.
See supra Tbl. B, p. 706.
186.
Mueller-Smith & Schnepel, supra note 173, at 911.
187.
Thank you to Craigie et al. for raising this point with us.
188.
Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks,
and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J. L. & ECON. 451 (2006).
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of lost earnings. This is especially likely to be the case for lost earnings that are due
to, for example, restrictions on occupational licensing for individuals with a
conviction record, employers’ refusal to interview or hire individuals who have a
conviction record (either by requiring it on a job application or via background
check), or employers’ channeling of individuals with conviction records into lowerpaying positions. One relevant finding from the Mueller-Smith and Schnepel study
is that individuals who benefitted from deferred adjudication were more likely to
find work in industries that were otherwise closed off to individuals with conviction
records (e.g., retail trade, health care, educational services).189 Additional evidence
comes from the immediate employment and wage gains that accrue to individuals
with a criminal record who obtain expungement.190 These findings suggest that some
amount of lost earnings because of employer stigma and legal barriers are indeed
recoverable.
D. The Earnings Effect of a Suspended Driver’s License
The research base on the economic impact of driver’s license suspension is
less well developed, but we wish to draw attention to this work despite its
provisional status. A study of driver history records in New Jersey found,
remarkably, just 10% of license suspension orders were for driving-related behavior
that could be construed as a road safety concern (e.g., driving under the influence,
points accumulation from moving violations, uninsured driving, reckless driving,
etc.).191 The lion’s share of suspensions was either for financial reasons (40%, e.g.,
for failure to pay motor vehicle authority surcharge, comply with a court-ordered
installment plan, or pay child support) or for nonappearance in court to satisfy a
summons (32%).192 In the same study, a survey of drivers with suspended licenses
sought to understand the collateral effects of license suspension. Among more than
300 respondents, 40% reported they were unable to keep their job after their
suspension, with low-income individuals far more likely to suffer job loss (64% of
those with income under $30,000).193 Almost one-fifth (17%) of the sample reported
not only losing their job but also being unable to find a new one. 194 Among those
who were able to find another job, almost all reported negative effects on their
income, but regrettably, the estimated amount of lost income was not included in the
survey.195 In a separate study, Pawasrat and Quinn assessed the impact of having a
valid driver’s license among welfare recipients as part of the administration of a
training program carried out in Milwaukee. 196 They report that among program
participants with less than 12 years of education, individuals with a valid driver’s
189.
Mueller-Smith & Schnepel, supra note 173, at 900–01.
190.
Prescott & Starr, supra note 24, at 2527; Jeffrey Selbin et al., Unmarked?
Criminal Record Clearing and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 46
(2018).
191.
Carnegie et al., supra note 112, at 33.
192.
Id. at 33, Tbl. 9.
193.
Id. at 55–57.
194.
Id.
195.
Id. at 56.
196.
John Pawasrat & Lois M. Quinn, The EARN (Early Assessment and Retention
Network) Model for Effectively Targeting WIA and TANF Resources to Participants, 60 ETI
PUBL’NS 1, 6 (2007).
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license were “four times more likely to show earnings above the poverty level,
compared to those without a current license.”197
The single study we found that attempted to specifically quantify the
impact on earnings of lacking a license was from the city of Phoenix’s “Compliance
Assistance Program” (“CAP”), which for a period of time reinstated driving
privileges of individuals with civil traffic violations and unpaid fines and fees. 198
The program restored licenses along with waiving some fees in exchange for
enrolling in a payment plan.199 From in-person and mail surveys of 75 program
enrollees, 31% of those who were employed reported losing their job as a direct
consequence of their suspended license and 57% reported working fewer hours. 200
Across the sample, the median income loss was estimated at $36,800 (with a range
of $1,200 to $300,000).201
The estimates provided here should be regarded as descriptive and,
therefore, highly provisional. We rely on the Phoenix study to estimate the impact
of license suspension on income, and although some of the needed information is
not provided in the study, it is the only study to date that attempts to quantify income
loss. Because the sample comprises individuals who enrolled in the CAP program,
they might have been especially motivated to do so because of job difficulty. 202
Acknowledging these and other limitations, we take at face value the estimate of
lost annual income for the typical (median) person with a suspended license to be
$36,800 but scale this downward to account for individuals who were not working
or whose work was not disrupted by suspension. We note that 36% of the sample
was not working at the time of license suspension, and among the workers, we
estimate that 72% experienced disruption either because of job loss (31%) or
reduction in hours (57%), with 72% representing our effort to adjust for double
counting.203 Using this information, we conservatively estimate that license
suspension results in about $12,700 in lost annual earnings.204 Multiplying this by
the number of people eligible for an occupational driver’s license (438,000) yields
197.
John Pawasrat & Lois M. Quinn, Research Brief on ETI Driver’s License
Studies, 186 ETI PUBL’NS 1, 4 (2017).
198.
Compliance
Assistance
Program
(CAP),
CITY
OF
PHX.,
https://www.phoenix.gov/court/cap [https://perma.cc/V7KX-F2WX].
199.
Id.
200.
The City of Phoenix Municipal Court’s Compliance Assistance Program,
2016: An Economic Assessment, L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN RSCH. INST. 19, 22 (June 2, 2017),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2018/11/Phoenix-license-restorationpilot-THE-CITY-OF-PHOENIX-MUNICIPAL-COURT%E2%80%99S-COMPLIANCEASSISTANCE-PROGRAM.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4AS-7K75].
201.
Id. at 22.
202.
Indeed, the authors shy away from using the analysis “for statistical analysis
or inferences.” See id. at 11.
203.
See id. at 20.
204.
We attempt to be conservative in our use of the information reported in the
Phoenix CAP study. Our estimate assumes 36% of the sample was not working and lost $0;
18% of the sample was working but did not experience disruption and lost $0; 23% of the
sample was working and lost $18,400 (the midpoint of $0 and the median $36,800); and 23%
of the sample was working and lost $36,800. Using the percentages as weights for lost
income, the mean is $12,696.
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an estimate of around $5.5 billion in lost earnings yearly due to not having a driver’s
license.205
While further research is sorely needed, recent qualitative studies and
accounts of “unlicensing” support an impact on earnings that is at least as large, if
not larger, than the estimate we report above. Job loss and job disqualification, and
lower-wage job options, appear to be the main mechanisms. For example, through
semi-structured phone interviews conducted in 2020 and 2021, Sartin and her coauthors found suspended license “employment challenges” to present in several
ways: directly, by preventing subjects from applying for the numerous jobs that
mandated licenses on or off the job, and indirectly, in terms of the type of work and
level of pay available to persons without licenses.206 Dindial and her co-authors, also
interviewing subjects across states, concluded that suspended licenses “creat[ed]
obstacles to finding or keeping paid work.”207 Jobs unavailable to people without
licenses include driving for Uber and Lyft, delivery and driving-related jobs,
automobile sales and services, home healthcare aides, and the construction trade. 208
Positions including retail security officer (pay: $10.55 per hour), caregiver for the
disabled ($10 per hour), eye-care associate, administrative assistant, and deli clerk
have also been reported to require a license.209 Studies show that employers also use
licenses as screens210 or a positive signal: “[P]ositions use a driver’s license as a
proxy for whether you’re employable.”211
In Texas, 20.8% of civilian jobs in 2016 required driving a passenger
vehicle.212 The state’s size and infrastructure have meant that 80% (+/- 0.2) of
workers in Texas at least 16 years old drove alone (i.e., did not carpool or rideshare)
to work in 2016.213 When a license is reinstated, it can quickly translate into an
205.
If we instead use $23,500 as our estimate of in lost earnings annually, based
on assuming that all 64% of people working at the time of the suspension had income around
the median ($36,800 x .64 = $23,552), our estimate of lost earnings balloons to $10B.
206.
Emma B. Sartin et al., Impacts of Non-Driving Related License Suspensions
on Quality of Life: A Qualitative Study, APPLIED RSCH. IN QUALITY OF LIFE 1, 11 (2022).
207.
Reckless Lawmaking: How Debt-Based Driver’s License Suspension Laws
Impose
Harm
and
Waste
Resources,
ACLU
26
(2021),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/reckless_lawmaking_aclu_final_4.1
9.21.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7AS-SVXS].
208.
Carnegie et al., supra note 112, at 3.
209.
Joseph Shapiro, How Driver’s License Suspensions Unfairly Target the Poor,
NPR (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/01/05/372691918/how-drivers-licensesuspensions-unfairly-target-the-poor [https://perma.cc/858A-EMLK].
210.
Carnegie et al., supra note 112, at 66.
211.
Alana Semuels, No Driver’s License, No Job, ATLANTIC (June 15, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/no-drivers-license-no-job/486653/
[https://perma.cc/T8RS-SGRT].
212.
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T LAB., 30 Percent of Civilian Jobs Require
Some Driving in 2016, ECON. DAILY (June 27, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/30percent-of-civilian-jobs-require-some-driving-in-2016.htm
[https://perma.cc/CD5HNGM8].
213.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Percent of Workers 16 Years and Over Who Traveled
to Work by Car, Truck, or Van—Drove Alone, AM. CMTY. SURV.,
https://www.census.gov/acs/www/data/data-tables-and-tools/geographic-comparison-tables/
[https://perma.cc/V3ZS-RTYZ].
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earnings opportunity, as the experience of 47-year-old John Blackwell illustrates. 214
Once Blackwell got his license back, Blackwell, who works as a carpenter foreman,
could earn “an additional $2 an hour [with the ability to] . . . drive a company
truck.”215 Assuming that Blackwell works 40 hours per week, the extra $2 per hour
adds up to $4,160 in wages per year.216
E. Comparing the Cumulative Earnings Effect of Texas’s Paper Prisons with the
Out-of-Pocket Cost of Texas’s Physical Prisons
Aggregating the most conservative estimates of lost earnings associated
with the second chance sealing and second chance relicensing gaps described above
yields a total that ranges from $5.6 billion (assuming complete overlap) to $6 billion
(assuming no overlap). By way of comparison, the entire 2022 operating budget for
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice was $3.7 billion.217
Taken at face value, our calculations suggest, strikingly, that the cost of
Texas’s “paper prisons,” in terms of lost earnings, is as large as, if not larger than,
the out-of-pocket cost of its physical prisons. Individuals lose out on economic
opportunities and higher earnings as they are shut out of a range of positions due to
their expungable records and suspended licenses. The loss of income and related
collateral impacts not only the person in the gap but also the state, whose taxable
income base is also reduced by the earnings gap, and whose public service
expenditures are likely to rise to fill the gaps left by limited economic opportunity.218
In sum, our proof-of-concept analysis of the fiscal cost of “paper prisons”
underscores that although often motivated by considerations of fairness, missed
second chances have significant and overlooked earnings and employment
consequences and also plausibly translate into lost taxes and higher costs—and
therefore economic consequences—for the state.

IV. AUTOMATION AND POLICY PILOTS
The previous Part considered the order-of-magnitude effects, in terms of
lost earnings, associated with the failed delivery of second chances in Texas. What
this exercise underscores is not only the large number of people for whom second
chances appear to have largely been missed chances, but also the large economic
and earnings impact associated with the second chance gap and the potential to
reverse, at least partially, these economic losses with policies that close the gaps.
Ways to both narrow the second chance gap and the gap in understanding its
economic impact are discussed in this Part. We start by considering the drivers of
Texas’s second chance gaps, then the reforms that could narrow them. We
214.
Angie Jackson, Penalized for Being Poor: Michigan Drivers Could Get Break
on
License
Suspensions,
DET.
FREE
PRESS,
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/08/01/michigan-drivers-licensesuspensions/4819150002/ [https://perma.cc/ZY2S-8ZYC].
215.
Id.
216.
$2/hour x 40 hours per week x 52 weeks per year = $4,160.
217.
Operating Budget for Fiscal Year 2022, TEX. BD. CRIM. JUST. 2 (Dec. 1, 2021),
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/documents/bfd/FY2022_Operating_Budget_LBB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6QWQ-CY6Y].
218.
See Mueller-Smith & Schnepel, supra note 173 at 899.
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recommend the use of policy pilots to both introduce policy interventions and
provide the research infrastructure for observing their outcomes.
A. Drivers of Texas’s Second Chance Gaps
Why don’t more people seek to clear their criminal convictions or reinstate
their lost driver’s licenses, given their negative impact on earnings and employment?
The processes of obtaining relief presented in Part I confirm a number of the same
barriers to relief documented by others, including lack of awareness, unclear criteria,
burdensome application processes, and fines and fees219 to impede the uptake of the
relief offered in Texas.
Texas law puts the impetus on the individual to initiate the process of reliefseeking through a petition. But in many cases, there is a lack of awareness about the
second chances to which one may be entitled. The awareness gap is particularly
acute when a second chance opportunity is first introduced or changes are made to
its eligibility. There is typically no specific advertising or communications budget
allocated for alerting eligible citizens that they can apply for relief—indeed, to
specify such a budget would likely reduce the chances of enactment in a climate of
fiscal austerity. This is a problem particularly in the case of record-relief provisions,
which are often updated frequently. Since record sealing was introduced in 2003,
legislative acts in 2015220 and 2017221 have changed who is eligible, making it
difficult for even the diligent to know when and if the law may apply to them.
Similarly, very few people are aware that ODLs are an option that would allow them
to drive to work or take care of other essential tasks. 222 As one report stated, “most
people with . . . [driver’s license] holds do not know that ODLs are an option and do
not apply for them.”223 Even for those that are aware, the process of applying for an
ODL has been described as “labyrinthine . . . . [J]ust determining which court to file
in can be impossible for many people to figure out on their own.” 224 Insufficient
information about how to reinstate licenses has also been cited as a barrier to
application in a number of states with programs similar to Texas. 225

219.
See Chien, supra note 23.
220.
S.B. 1902, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015) (relating to the eligibility of
criminal defendants for an order of nondisclosure of criminal history record information;
authorizing a fee).
221.
H.B. 3016, 2017 Leg., 85th Sess. (Tex. 2017) (relating to the eligibility of a
criminal defendant for an order of nondisclosure of criminal history record information).
222.
Driven by Debt, supra note 71.
223.
Id.
224.
Id.
225.
See Reckless Lawmaking: How Debt-Based Driver’s License Suspension Laws
Impose
Harm
and
Waste
Resources,
ACLU
20
(2021),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/reckless_lawmaking_aclu_final_4.1
9.21.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3ZW-4YN2] (“Some felt the steps and procedures were unclear,
while others had to do their own research to figure out what to do, contacting several different
agencies and even going back and forth to several locations while legally prevented from
driving.”).
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Ambiguous or undefined criteria226 and discretion-based processes also
contribute to the gap. They discourage uptake because they make the payoff from
the application process uncertain. This is particularly a problem because of the
costly, burdensome, and informationally intensive processes described in Part I.227
Petition filing fees,228 as well as the requirement to satisfy unpaid fines,
fees, and surcharges, also present substantial barriers. Indeed, the requirement that
226.
For example, people convicted of first-time misdemeanors punishable by fine
only and misdemeanors carrying a sentence of incarceration are ineligible to have their
records sealed if the misdemeanor in question was a violent crime or a crime of a sexual
nature, with the exception of offenses under Penal Code § 22.01. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 411.0735 (2017). But Code of Criminal Procedure § 59.01(3) defines a crime of violence
as “ . . . (A) any criminal offense defined in the Penal Code or in a federal criminal law that
results in a personal injury to a victim . . . [or] (B) an act that is not an offense under the Penal
Code involving the operation of a []vehicle [] that results in injury or death . . . ,” facts that
are impossible to evaluate without delving into the court record. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
59.01(3) (2022). Additionally, although some offenses like rape are obviously of a sexual
nature, we could not find any clear definition of a crime of a sexual nature in the penal code.
As a result, determining whether an offense is of a violent or sexual nature is not
straightforward. The phrase the “same criminal episode” has also raised statutory
interpretation challenges:
A court may not order the expunction of records and files relating to an
arrest for an offense for which a person is subsequently acquitted,
whether by the trial court, a court of appeals, or the court of criminal
appeals, if the offense for which the person was acquitted arose out of a
criminal episode, as defined by Penal Code § 3.01, and the person was
convicted of or remains subject to prosecution for at least one other
offense occurring during the criminal episode.
Id. art. 55.01(c) (2021). Oddly, two offenses can be considered to have occurred under the
same criminal episode regardless of how many years apart the offenses occurred. HB 2684
(Canales): Clean Slate Eligibility, CLEAN SLATE TEX., https://de203503-6f74-4104-bc1ddc9fde7da5dd.filesusr.com/ugd/413c6c_54294486d6644a2194cd9577f4799d35.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DLV7-YR6Q] (last visited Aug. 24, 2021). In cases such as In re
Expunction of M.T.R., 606 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App. 2020), Texas courts have recently
interpreted this to mean that “if a person is convicted of one offense, then later is acquitted of
a ‘same or similar offense,’ the acquitted case is ineligible for expunction,” an outcome that
advocates have described as leading to “absurd results.” Id. Determining whether an offense
is the same or similar insofar as expunction eligibility is concerned makes the process of
determining whether someone should get a second chance more involved and costly.
227.
As one of us has previously written:
In the same way that the accused remain innocent until proven guilty in
the U.S. criminal justice system, many second chance programs require
defendants to ‘prove’ that they deserve second chances before awarding
them. As such, getting one’s second chance through petition-based
processes may include enduring a bureaucratic and expensive process,
amassing information through a variety of sources, and being evaluated
by an adjudicative or administrative body.
Chien, supra note 23, at 540–41.
228.
For example, the cost of expungement is $750 to $2,500, not including the cost
of traveling to the hearing as well as filing fees, which, if not waived, can add an additional
$200 and $400. Fees and Costs, DALL. EXPUNCTION ATT’YS, https://www.dallas-expunctionattorney.com/fees-and-costs/ [https://perma.cc/DMU9-JNE3]. Based on other research,
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fines and fees be paid off may be the most important barrier to restoring driver’s
licenses. One prime example of this is the OmniBase Program, which has no feewaiving mechanism.229 “OmniBase holds aren’t lifted even when somebody appears
in court and gets on a payment plan or begins assigned community service. The only
way to lift a hold is to satisfy the fines and costs in full.” 230 This lack of a fee-waiving
mechanism is critical because “[m]ore than one in four OmniBase holds between
2013 and 2017 were a result of poverty-related offenses such as driving without
insurance, displaying expired license plates, driving with an invalid license, or no
driver’s license at all.”231
B. Narrowing Texas’s Second Chance Gaps
The most impactful way to improve the administration of second chances
would be to eliminate fines and fee requirements, as other states have done,232 and
to streamline delivery through automation. Due to different administrative aspects
of the laws, automation would look slightly different for each type of second chance.
For instance, automatically sealing records would ideally follow the clean slate
model, which uses computer queries to identify eligible individuals and then
automatically seals those people’s records.233 A similar program could automatically
look at whether individuals meet the ODL eligibility criteria and invite eligible
individuals to apply.
Automation makes the application process less burdensome in four ways.
First, automation would reduce the awareness gap for individuals seeking second
chances because it would not only identify eligible individuals but also either invite
individuals eligible for relief to apply or provide relief to eligible individuals.
Second, automation makes it so that people seeking to seal their records do not need
to complete a petition, thereby “streamlin[ing] petition-based record clearing—a
getting an expunction could be slightly less expensive than sealing one’s record. See Ruthie
Goldstein, Note, Moving Forward: Proposals for Expanding and Simplifying Expungements
in Texas, 98 TEX. L. Rᴇᴠ. ONLINE 144, 158–59 (2020) (“Because expunctions can only be
granted after filing a petition with the court and because drafting the petition typically requires
the assistance of an attorney, the cost of an expunction can total between $500 and $2,500,
not including filing fees. Filing fees typically total between $200 and $400, but can be waived
for indigency.”).
229.
Gerrick & Mergler, supra note 33.
230.
Id.
231.
Driven By Debt: How Driver’s Licenses Suspensions for Unpaid Fines and
Fees Hurt Texas Families, TEX. FAIR DEF. PROJECT & TEX. APPLESEED (Mar. 2, 2019),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/license-suspensions-hurt-texas-families/
[https://perma.cc/Q5BQ-5JZN]. For a full report, see Driven By Debt, supra note 71.
232.
See H.B. 440, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019), (eliminating, in 2020, the
requirement in Pennsylvania that fines and fees be paid off prior to receiving “clean slate”
relief; see also Aaron Moselle, Pa. Residents with Court Debts Could Have Their Records
Automatically Sealed Under New Bill, WHYY (Oct. 22, 2020), https://whyy.org/articles/paresidents-with-court-debt-could-have-their-records-automatically-sealed-under-new-bill/
[https://perma.cc/DF88-P8HC].
233.
See
Introducing
Clean
Slate,
CLEAN
SLATE
INITIATIVE,
https://www.cleanslateinitiative.org/#:~:text=A%20new%20bipartisan%20policy%20model
,be%20able%20to%20get%20ahead [https://perma.cc/T3Q3-AA6P] (defining the clean slate
model and discussing the movement in states across the United States).
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costly and time-intensive process that prevents the vast majority of eligible people
from ever obtaining needed relief.”234 Third, automation could reduce the number
of individuals who need an attorney to help them navigate complicated application
processes. Fourth, automation, coupled with the elimination of fines and fees, would
remove the financial obstacles to getting a second chance. Notably, however, the
reduction of fines and fees would apply only to record sealing, at least based on the
policy changes this Article proposes. As such, the driver’s relicensing gap might
remain large until policymakers find a way to either make fee waivers more
accessible or eliminate filing fees.
There are at least three types of concerns that relate to automating second
chances. One is that developing the systems needed to identify and notify eligible
individuals requires time, money, and oversight.235 These are real costs that must be
accounted for but should also be balanced against our roughly estimated loss of up
to $3.5 billion annually in lost earnings and associated state revenue (for example,
in terms of sales tax), just from the second chance sealing gap. This may be why a
financial report for H.B. 3601, a proposed clean slate bill from the 87th Legislature,
reported that “[n]o significant fiscal implication to the State is anticipated.”236
Indeed, the state revenue associated with the more efficient allocation of labor and
the reduction of unemployment or underemployment plausibly could be net revenue
positive in the long term relative to the status quo.237
The second concern about automating second chances is that automating
the current law cannot actually be done effectively due to the unclear criteria and
data deficiencies highlighted earlier in this Article. For instance, some scholars
express concern that automating expunctions might not be realistic:

234.
Clean Slate Toolkit: Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Nov.
15,
2018),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/reports/2018/11/15/460907/clean-slatetoolkit/ [https://perma.cc/KH9U-XKT8]. Several states have implemented clean slate policies
with great success. For example, Pennsylvania’s 2018 clean slate bill sealed over 47 million
offenses and helped an estimated 1.1 million people within one year of its launch. Laurie
Mason Schroder, In One Year, Pa.’s Clean Slate Law Has Erased 35 million Crimes. What’s
Next?, MORNING CALL (June 30, 2020), https://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-nwspennsylvania-clean-slate-law-one-year-20200630-ges77qb3ffahhiznbjzjtelq7q-story.html
[https://perma.cc/5M6P-Q2AY].
235.
See Goldstein, supra note 228, at 159–60 (“Ultimately, in a state as large as
Texas, it might not be financially feasible to require that expunctions become automatic.”)
However, recognizing that fees pose a barrier to people seeking expunction, Goldstein
proposes waiving filing fees as an alternative to automation. Id.
236.
LEGIS. BUDGET BD., FISCAL NOTE, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. 1 (Tex. 2021),
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/87R/fiscalnotes/pdf/HB03601I.pdf#navpanes=0
[https://perma.cc/6V2V-BTTW].
237.
Roger Wilkins, The Consequences of Underemployment for the
Underemployed,
49(2)
J.
INDUS.
RELS.
247,
264–65
(2007),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022185607074921 [https://perma.cc/FZ7ZCNEW] ("Not only does underemployment represent a failure to utilize a significant share of
the economy’s available labour resources, it is also associated with considerable adverse
consequences for individuals who are underemployed.”).
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[In Texas] expunctions cannot be granted until the statute of
limitations has passed. Statutes of limitation vary by crime and
class of crime, and keeping track of their expiration would put a
significant burden on counties, which would most likely be
responsible for processing the automatic expunctions.
Additionally, assuming an “automatic expunction” [or automatic
sealing] bill is retroactive, it would be extremely time-consuming
for counties to look back into their old records, determine what
can be expunged, and go through the expunction process. 238
Such concerns are likely true for record sealing and ODLs. However, we
note that although automating second chances “would require significant data
normalization and cleaning efforts,”239 reforming the law to make it implementable
at scale can provide a path forward. To illustrate this, we discuss clearance criteria
challenges and legislative drafting alternatives to overcome these challenges in
Appendix 8. This could serve as a foundation for starting to adjust Texas’s laws to
the reality of Texas’s data.
The third concern is more general––it is about the effectiveness of records
relief as a way to achieve the policy aims of public safety, job growth, and equity.
Specifically, statistical discrimination could replace records-based exclusion, a lack
of knowledge of sealed records could render the policy devoid of impact, and the
risk of automating relatively minor crimes could intensify the earnings penalty for
people with more significant records.240
C. Narrowing Knowledge Gaps About the Earnings Impact of Sealing and
Driver’s License Restoration
The introduction of an intervention to narrow the second chance gap at the
county or state level presents a chance not only to narrow the second chance gap but
also to narrow the knowledge gap about the associated earnings impact. Policy
pilots, which temporarily change or observe a change in law or policy in part so that
lawmakers and scholars can learn from doing so,241 can provide an excellent way to
overcome “the knowledge gap and risk aversion in policy development.”242
There are at least two ways that policy pilots could improve the delivery of
second chances. First, carrying out an automation trial could help lawmakers
identify ambiguity in the existing statute and pinpoint how it needs to be adjusted to
support records clearance at scale. Second, policy pilots could be used to study the
impact on earnings of newly available second chance relief, for example, in order to
carry out the cost–benefit analysis of such a policy to the state. Such policy pilots
would not only provide valuable information about the true cost of Texas’s second
chance gaps but would also provide lawmakers with additional information to ensure
that they pursue cost-effective policy solutions.
238.
Goldstein, supra note 228, at 160.
239.
Chien et al., supra note 92, at 2.
240.
Chien, supra note 23, at 585.
241.
Colleen V. Chien, Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the
Administration of Law, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2313, 2316 (2019).
242.
Id.
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The best prospect would be for a study conducted at the individual level
involving the matching of administrative records from multiple agencies. This might
include the state law enforcement agency that maintains a criminal history repository
with arrests and charges, and local and county courts that retain data on convictions
and sentences along with nonpenal sanctions such as fines and fees. Other relevant
agencies include the state motor vehicle authority with data on license suspensions
and traffic violations and state labor and welfare agencies that collect data on
earnings and transfer payments. To ensure that the impact of closing a second chance
gap can be discerned using experimental or quasi-experimental methods, local
policy labs such as the Texas Policy Lab at Rice University or the Texas Public
Policy Foundation think tank could be appointed to consult on the policy’s rollout.243 Upstream attention to implementation will support downstream learning
about interventions to boost the workforce.

CONCLUSION
This Article provides an estimate of the annual earnings loss associated
with a conviction, finding it to be on the order of $5,100 to $6,400 per year, as well
as a provisional estimate of the annual earnings loss associated with a suspended
driver’s license, conservatively estimating it to be approximately $12,700. Using
Texas as a case study, it quantifies the size of the state’s second chance sealing and
occupational driver’s license gaps, estimating that around 670,000 Texans could seal
their misdemeanor convictions and about 438,000 Texans are eligible for ODLs.
Mechanically aggregating these figures results in an earnings loss estimate of $3.5
billion in connection with the second chance sealing gap and $5.5 billion from the
second chance ODL gap in Texas, in comparison with the $3.6 billion operating
budget of Texas’s correctional system. This suggests not only that the costs of paper
prisons could exceed the cost of physical prisons but also that closing paper prisons,
through automation, like closing physical prisons, can have fiscal benefits that have
not yet been accounted for, although rigorous evaluation and research are needed to
see whether this is the case.

243.

Id.

718

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64:675

APPENDIX
A. Rules
To estimate the number and share of people eligible for but not receiving
sealing, compassionate release, and driver’s license restoration in Texas, we used
the methodology established in Part II. For more information about our approach,
please see Colleen V. Chien, America’s Paper Prisons: The Second Chance Gap,
Michigan Law Review (2020).
1. Sizing the Texas Sealing Second Chance Gap
To estimate the number of Texans eligible for records sealing, we focused
narrowly on the subset of people that could, if eligibility criteria were automatically
applied to them, transition from having a misdemeanor conviction or deferred
adjudication to not having a conviction or deferred adjudication under Texas
Government Code Chapter 411.244 To conduct our analysis, we acquired the CCH
from the Texas Department of Public Safety.245 To support our analysis of the uptake
rate of sealing, the DPS also sent us administrative data containing historical
information about the number of people who had their records sealed annually.
We imported and then inner joined the data to create unique IDs for each
person. Once we had created unique IDs, we randomly selected 153,674 individuals
for our sample. To make sure our data was consistent, we removed about 40
individuals whose sentence expiration dates were earlier than their sentence start
dates, leaving us with a random sample of 153,632 individuals. We then turned to
cleaning the data, focusing first on categorizing disposition data. 246 Likewise, we
categorized the following dispositions as nonconvictions: not guilty, dismissed,
mistrial, abandoned charges, waived, acquitted, community supervision expired,
deferred, unadjudicated, dead, pending, dismissed, and mentally incompetent. After
categorizing the dispositions, we turned to cleaning the sentencing data. Though
2,041,483 records in our sample had sentence completion data, for 554,444 records,
the data was missing. Rather than exclude these records from our analysis, we
instead calculated, from the cases where the data was present, the average lag
between sentencing and sentence completion, added these numbers (2.9 years after
the date of sentencing and 3.2 years for misdemeanors and felonies, respectively),
and used this to roughly estimate sentence completion dates.
To be conservative in our estimates about the number of individuals
eligible for record sealing, we made a number of assumptions when conducting our
analysis. First, because we could not easily determine whether offenses were of a
violent or sexual nature, we manually determined whether 14 offenses would be

244.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.072 (2017).
245.
About CCH: A Brief Guide to the Texas Computerized Criminal History
System (CCH), supra note 96.
246.
Based on consultation with criminal law experts, we categorized the following
dispositions as convictions: convicted, multiple charges, commuted, amend probation,
convicted – appeal pending, pardoned, probation discharge, probation revocation, sentence
modified, convicted – lesser charge, and mistrial.
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ineligible due to being offenses of a violent or sexual nature.247 When in doubt after
reading the statutes associated with these 14 offenses, we assumed that they were
ineligible to be conservative in our estimates.248 Second, we assumed that offenses
that appeared in the data as misdemeanors but had a statute indicating an
enhancement to a state jail felony or a felony were ineligible. 249 Third, if someone
has ever been convicted of an offense listed in Tex. Gov. Code 411.074(b), that
person cannot have any of the offenses on their record sealed. Most of those offenses
were easy to model, but some depended on facts of the case that we did not have
access to. In these cases, we assumed that anyone convicted of these offenses was
ineligible.250 Finally, we assumed that someone was incarcerated if the number of
days between the disposition date and the sentence expiration date was greater than
two years.251 When the data contains both sentence expiration date and a parole date
for the same person and offense, we assume that any sentence expiration date that is
greater than the parole-until date indicates time in prison.
Despite our efforts to be conservative, there is a further noteworthy
limitation to our analysis. While we only model sealing for adults, the sealing data
that we acquired from the Department of Public Safety includes the aggregate
number of sealings for juveniles and adults. As such, it is likely that we overestimate
the pace of relief provided under the current, application-based method, and
overestimate the uptake rate and underestimate the Current Gap.
2. Rules252*
Orders of Nondisclosure and Expunction
Primary Sources: Texas Gov. Code Chap. 411 | Sec. 411.072 | 411.0725 |
411.073 | 411.0731 | 411.0735 | 411.074 | Art. 55.01(2019)

247.
Although we did our best with the data cleaning, it is always worth noting that
the dirty nature of the data could have impacted our findings and is thus a weakness. Also,
when identifying whether convictions were of a violent or sexual nature, we relied on the
following resource: TEX. OFF. CT. ADMIN., supra note 57.
248.
For instance, we assumed that TEX. LAB. CODE § 51.031 (2021) (child labor
law) and TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a)(2) (aggravated assault with a deadly weapon) were
ineligible.
249.
Examples of such offenses in our dataset include TEX. PENAL CODE §§
49.045(b), 49.09(b-4), 49.07(c).
250.
For instance, an individual convicted of § 30.02 (Burglary), Penal Code, is
ineligible if “the offense or conduct is punishable under Subsection (d) of that section and the
actor committed the offense or engaged in the conduct with intent to commit a felony listed
in Paragraph (A) or (C).” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.001(5)(D); TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 411.074(b) (2017). We do not have access to this data, so we assume that all individuals
convicted of burglaries are ineligible.
251.
Statutory Wrongdoing and its Consequences, TEX. POL. PROJECT (Jan. 8,
2022), https://texaspolitics.utexas.edu/archive/html/just/features/0201_01/crimeandp.html
[https://perma.cc/K97K-MNMH].
252.
Reprinted with permission. *Thank you to Hithesh Sekhar Bathala, Obie
Reynolds, and Ahmanda Lee for contributing the concise statement as well as the shorter
version of this article, published at paperprisons.org.
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Secondary Sources: University of Texas Guide (2019) | Texas CCRC
(12/3/2021) | App | Texas Law Help OND Prep Guide
A. CONVICTIONS
Any first-time misdemeanor conviction if it is the person’s only conviction
or deferred adjudication after a two-year waiting period (in which the person cannot
get an additional conviction or deferred adjudication) following sentence
completion (Sec. 411.0735).253
In addition to universal disqualifiers, ineligible offenses under this section
include misdemeanor offenses that are:
Violent or sexual in nature (with the exception of § 22.01, Penal Code)
Convictions under § 106.41 Alcoholic Beverage Code
Driving While Intoxicated (Penal Code § 49.04)
Boating while Intoxicated (Penal Code § 49.06)
Assembling or operating an amusement ride while intoxicated (Alcoholic
Beverage Code § 49.065)
Organized crime (Chapter 71, Penal Code)
Any DWI conviction under Section 49.04, Penal Code, if it is the person’s
only offense (conviction or deferred adjudication) after a two- to five-year waiting
period (in which the person cannot get additional convictions deferred
adjudications) (Sec. 411.0736).254 (In our model, we default to five years in order to
be conservative in our estimates.)
In addition to universal disqualifiers, ineligible offenses include 49.04(d),
Penal Code (driving while intoxicated with a BAC greater than 0.15).
B. DEFERRED ADJUDICATIONS
Any felony that is sentenced to deferred adjudication community
supervision after a five-year waiting period starting from community supervision
completion and offense dismissal (in which the person cannot get additional
convictions deferred adjudications) (Sec 411.0725).
In addition to universal disqualifiers, ineligible offenses include:
Driving While Intoxicated (Penal Code §49.04)
Any misdemeanor that is sentenced to deferred adjudication community
supervision after up to a two-year waiting period starting from community
supervision completion and offense dismissal (in which the person cannot get
additional convictions deferred adjudications) (Sec 411.0725) including offenses
under 49.04 and 49.06 (411.0726).
253.
Please note that all offenses have a two-year waiting period except for those
punishable by fine only, which do not have a waiting period. We do not model this nuance
because we use the longest waiting period to be conservative in our estimates.
254.
Some offenses have a two-year waiting period rather than a five-year waiting
period. However, we default to five years in order to be conservative in our estimates.
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C. UNIVERSAL DISQUALIFIERS
Ineligible per 411.074(b) if an individual has any convicted or deferred
adjudication offense:
Requiring registration as a sex offender (Section 62.001(5))
Involving aggravated kidnapping (Section 20.04)
Involving homicide (Sections 19.02, 19.03)
Involving human trafficking (Sections 20A.02, 20A.03)
Involving child/elder abuse (Sections 22.04, 22.041)
Involving family violence (Sections 25.07, 25.072, 71.004)
Involving stalking (Section 42.072)
Flying while Intoxicated (Penal Code § 49.05)
D. UNMODELED CRITERIA
Did not model expunctions eligibility for nonconvictions. (Art. 55.01(a))
Did not model shorter waiting period for certain deferred adjudication
community supervision under 411.072 (first-time nonviolent misdemeanor
offenses) or 411.0726 (deferred adjudication for DWI)
Did not include sealing eligibility for individuals that successfully
complete veteran’s treatment court (Sec. 411.0727)
Did not include sealing eligibility by individuals that are victims of
trafficking (Sec. 411.0728)
Did not model expunction eligibility for Class C Misdemeanors sentenced
to community supervision (Article 55.01(a)(2)).
Did not model whether LFOs were repaid
Did not model whether certain deferred adjudication offenses eligible for
OND/sealing had “affirmative finding under Article 42A.105(f), Code of Criminal
Procedure . . . filed in the papers of the case” (411.072(a)(1)(b), 411.0726(a)(2))
Did not model whether certain deferred adjudication offenses otherwise
eligible for OND/sealing had findings under “former Section 5(k), Article 42.12,
Code of Criminal Procedure . . . filed in the papers of the case” (411.072(a)(1)(b)).
Did not model certain offenses requiring registration as a sex offender
(62.05(D), 62.05(E), 62.05(G), 62.05(H), 62.05(I)), that would be universally
ineligible.
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Appendix Table 1: Detailed View of The Texas Second Chance Gap
Population

Estimated Number of
People with
Convictions
% Male

People in the
Criminal
Population

People Eligible for
Any Records Relief

People Eligible for
Sealing of All
Convictions

4.8 million

675,305

59,663

85%

87%

85%

Top Felony Deferred
Adjudication
Community
Supervision

poss cs pg 1 <1g
(11.4%), DWI 3rd
or more (4.2%),
burglary (3.7%)

poss cs pg 1 <1g,
driving while
intoxicated 3rd or
more iat

Top Convictions Misdemeanors

poss marij <2oz
(8.3%), DWI
(5.6%), assault
(3.7%)

driving while
intoxicated, poss
marij <2oz, driving
while intoxicated 2nd

driving while intoxicated,
poss marij <2oz, assault
causes bodily injury
family member

17

19

Average Years Since
Last Conviction
Share of People
Whose Last
Conviction Was 10+
Years Ago

12.6

~50% (2,407,274) 66% (446,545)

49,537 (83%)

Average Age at First
Conviction

28

28

28

Average Current Age
of People with
Convictions

45

47

46

Median Years Since
Last Conviction

11

15

20

White and Latinx %
(Share in Pop. = 82%)

0.69

0.73

0.69

Black % (Share in
Pop. = 13%)

0.31

0.26

0.3

Asian % (Share in
Pop. = 5%)

0.01

0.01

0.01
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Appendix Table 2: Data Sample Description 255
Data Statistics
Number of People in Dataset

4,826,860

Sample Size

153,674

OND Sample Data Statistics
Number of People with Misdemeanor Convictions in Sample

94,403
(61.45%)

Estimated Number of People with Misdemeanor Convictions in
Population

2,966,662

Number of People with Felony Convictions in Sample

122,611
(79.81%)

Estimated Number of People with Felony Convictions in
Population

3,853,113

Average Age of Misdemeanor Convictions

46 years old

B. Common Charges256
A. Top 10 Charges in Our Dataset
B. Top 10 Misdemeanor Convictions in Sample
C. Top 10 Felony Convictions in Sample
D. Top 10 Charges Eligible for OND in Our Dataset

255.
256.

A shorter version of this article is available at paperprisons.org.
A shorter version of this article is available at paperprisons.org.
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Appendix Table 3: Top 10 Charges in Sample
Number of
Records

Percentage
of Charges

poss cs pg 1 <1g

335,265

12.97%

36,232

poss marij <2oz

238,491

9.22%

34,202

driving while intoxicated

147,550

5.71%

27,365

burglary of habitation

116,005

4.49%

13,836

driving while intoxicated 3rd or
more iat

111,187

4.3%

12,627

assault causes bodily injury family
member

103,171

3.99%

17,562

poss cs pg 1 >=1g<4g

95,857

3.71%

12,585

assault causes bodily inj

75,109

2.9%

12,107

burglary of building

72,598

2.81%

8,004

unauth use of vehicle

67,916

2.63%

8,311

Charges

Number of
People with
Charges

Appendix Table 4. Top 10 Misdemeanor Convictions in Sample
Charges

Number of
Records

Percentage
of Charges

Number of
People with
Charges

poss marij <2oz

215,379

8.33%

34,166

driving while intoxicated

145,373

5.62%

27,335

assault causes bodily injury family
member

95,485

3.69%

17,521

assault causes bodily inj

69,788

2.7%

12,079

driving while intoxicated 2nd

55,722

2.15%

10,659

fail to id fugitive intent give false
info

53,855

2.08%

8,688
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resist arrest search or transport

53,052

2.05%

8,812

driving
w/lic
inv
conv/susp/w/o fin res

39,245

1.52%

6,796

poss cs pg 3 < 28g

27,195

1.05%

5,233

evading arrest detention

26,269

1.02%

5,500

w/prev

Appendix Table 5. Top 10 Felony Convictions in Sample
Charges

Number of
Records

Percentage
of Charges

Number of
People with
Charges

poss cs pg 1 <1g

295,925

11.44%

35,970

driving while intoxicated 3rd or
more iat

108,898

4.21%

12,573

burglary of habitation

95,745

3.7%

13,789

poss cs pg 1 >=1g<4g

81,261

3.14%

12,557

burglary of building

64,327

2.49%

7,864

unauth use of vehicle

61,414

2.37%

8,236

man del cs pg 1 <1g

54,832

2.12%

5,957

forgery financial instrument

54,563

2.11%

7,046

man del cs pg 1 >=4g<200g

50,568

1.96%

8,240

poss cs pg 1 >=4g<200g

41,772

1.62%

6,936
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Appendix Table 6. Top 10 Misdemeanor Conviction Charges Eligible for OND
in our Dataset
Charges Eligible
for OND

Number of
Records

Percentage of
Charges

Number of
People with
Charges

poss marij <2oz

10,315

0.4%

10,315

assault causes
bodily injury
family member257

4,648

0.18%

4,648

assault causes
bodily inj

3,651

0.14%

3,651

driving while
intoxicated 2nd

3,169

0.12%

3,169

fail to id fugitive
intent give false
info

2,372

0.09%

2,372

resist arrest search
or transport

2,217

0.09%

2,217

poss cs pg 3 < 28g

1,041

0.04%

1,041

evading arrest
detention

1,027

0.04%

1,027

theft prop
>=$100<$750

579

0.02%

579

poss dangerous
drug

444

0.02%

444

257.
In Texas, assault is not considered a violent felony as listed in Section
411.0735(c-1). TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.0735(c-1) (2017).
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Robustness Test and Histogram for Sentence Expiration Date Assumptions

The two bars on the left show the average number of years in jail when
records with missing sentence expiration dates are excluded. The blue bar shows the
average number of years for felony charges, and the orange bar shows the average
number of years of misdemeanor charges.
The two bars on the right show the average number of years in jail when
records with missing sentence expiration dates are assumed to be sentence start dates
+ 2.9 years for misdemeanor convictions and + 3.2 years for felony convictions.
Detailed Record Relief Statistics258
We obtained OND statistics from the Texas Department of Public Safety,
which reports that 18,593 ONDs were processed between fiscal years 2014 and
2019. In addition, we obtained the number of ODLs granted from the Texas
Department of Public Safety, which reports that 44,812 ODLs were granted between
September 2017 and February 2020.259 A breakdown of each type of relief granted
by year is available in Table H below.

258.
259.

A shorter version of this information is available at paperprisons.org.
See TEX. Dᴇᴘ’ᴛ Pᴜʙ. Sᴀғᴇᴛʏ, supra note 142.
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Appendix Table 7. Breakdown of Record Relief Granted Per Year in Texas
Year

ONDs Processed in
Fiscal Year

ODLs Granted in
Calendar Year

2020

N/A

2,637*

2019

2,650

16,350

2018

2,558

15,831

2017

2,313

12,631+

2016

2,360

N/A

2015

4,258

N/A

2014

4,454

N/A

*ODLs granted for 2017 are from September 2017 - December 2017
+ODLs granted for 2020 are from January 2020 - February 2020
Appendix Table 8: Clearance Criteria Challenges and Legislative Drafting
Alternatives260
Criteria

Sentence
Completion
(OND)

260.

Administrative
Challenge

Example

Not tracked in
court data and
hard to infer as
clean sentencing
data is often not
available; it also is
often
unclear
whether or not
outstanding fines
and fees must be

“Notwithstanding Disposition Date
any
other (+ X Years)
provision of this
subchapter
or
Subchapter F, a
person described
by Subsection (a)
who completes the
person’s sentence,
including
any

Chien et al., supra note 92, at 10; Chien, supra note 23.

Drafting
Alternative
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paid, and whether
they have been.

First conviction;
qualifying
conditions (OND)

Personal
demographic trait
such
as
age,
military status, or
other
condition
(OND)

term
of
confinement
imposed
and
payment
of
all
Lack of unique
fines,
costs,
and
identifier across
restitution
precludes
imposed,
may
determination
petition the court
that imposed the
sentence for an
order
of
nondisclosure of
criminal history
record
information under
this section . . . ”
(Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 411.0735(b))

729

Information may
not be easily
ascertainable
/
available on the
record or charge
category condition

“(a) This section
applies only to a
person
who
successfully
completes
a
veterans treatment
court
program
under Chapter 124
or former law.
(b)
Notwithstanding
any
other
provision of this
subchapter
or
Subchapter F, a
person described
by Subsection (a)
is entitled to file
with the court that
placed the person
in the veterans
treatment
court
program a petition
for an order of
nondisclosure of
criminal history
record

Bless commercial
identification
approximation
technique

Specify
an
identification
strategy that can
be implemented at
scale or do not
include
demographic traits
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information under
this section . . . ”
(Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 411.0727)

Class or grade
condition (OND)

Missing
class,
grade, or category
information

“A person may Explicitly specify
petition the court the
qualifying
that imposed the crimes
sentence for an
order
of
nondisclosure of
criminal history
record
information under
this section only
on or after: (1) the
date of completion
of the person’s
sentence, if the
offense of which
the person was
convicted was a
misdemeanor
punishable by fine
only; or (2) the
second
anniversary of the
date of completion
of the person’s
sentence, if the
offense of which
the person was
convicted was a
misdemeanor
other
than
a
misdemeanor
described
by
Subdivision (1).”
(Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 411.0735(d))

Court-ordered
conditions (OND
and ODL)

Require individual
review /check for
any
“courtordered”

“All reinstatement
fees must be paid
prior to applying
for, renewing, or

Do not include
court-ordered
conditions, waive
fees repayment, or
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conditions
compliance
same

Laundry list of
disposition criteria
(OND)

and upgrading a driver allow
re: license.
This garnishing
includes applying wages
for
an
occupational or
interlock driver
license.” (Texas
Department
of
Public
Safety,
Driver’s License,
Section
7:
Reinstatement
Fees)

Vulnerable
to
changes
to
definitions,
requires detailed
clean data

“A person may not
be granted an
order
of
nondisclosure of
criminal history
record
information under
this
subchapter . . . if:
(1) the
person requests
the
order
of
nondisclosure for,
or the person has
been previously
convicted of or
placed on deferred
adjudication
community
supervision for:
(A) an offense
requiring
registration as a
sex offender under
Chapter 62, Code
of
Criminal
Procedure; (B) an
offense
under
Section
20.04,
Penal
Code,
regardless
of
whether
the

731
for
of

Simple
description, e.g.,
“All records that
do not end in a
conviction”
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offense
is
a
reportable
conviction
or
adjudication for
purposes
of
Chapter 62, Code
of
Criminal
Procedure; (C) an
offense
under
Section
19.02,
19.03,
20A.02,
20A.03,
22.04,
22.041,
25.07,
25.072, or 42.072,
Penal Code; or (D)
any other offense
involving family
violence,
as
defined by Section
71.004,
Family
Code; or (2) the
court makes an
affirmative
finding that the
offense for which
the
order
of
nondisclosure is
requested
involved family
violence,
as
defined by Section
71.004,
Family
Code.”
(Tex.
Gov’t
Code
§411.074(b)
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